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Security Council

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Letter dated 1 December 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to submit a factual update to my report of 12 September 2006 on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2006/780), in particular on the operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and other relevant United Nations activities. In doing so, I have noted and welcome the continuing commitment of the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to all aspects of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I. Respect for the Blue Line

Since my report of 12 September 2006, the military and security situation in the UNIFIL area of operation has further stabilized. The cessation of hostilities was maintained and there were no serious incidents or confrontations. Nevertheless, UNIFIL observed and reported air violations by Israeli jets and unmanned aerial vehicles on an almost daily basis. On 31 October and again on 16 November, UNIFIL recorded a total of 14 such overflights on each day. A number of these took the form of mock air attacks above the headquarters of the French battalion of UNIFIL located in the general area of Frun. In another instance, two Israeli jets flew within two nautical miles of a French ship that is part of the Interim Maritime Task Force. The Government of Lebanon has protested the overflights as a serious violation of Lebanese sovereignty in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006). Israel, however, maintains that they are not violations but a necessary security measure and its Minister of Defence has linked them to the return of two Israel Defense Force (IDF) soldiers captured by Hizbollah on 12 July and full respect for the arms embargo established in paragraphs 14 and 15 of resolution 1701 (2006). While mindful of the Israeli motivations to continue their air incursions into Lebanese airspace, I would note that such violations of Lebanese sovereignty, which stand in contradiction to resolution 1701 (2006) and other relevant resolutions, undermine the credibility of both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and compromise overall efforts to stabilize the situation in the south and efforts to build trust and confidence generally.

UNIFIL observed and recorded a number of minor ground violations of the Blue Line by the IDF and Israeli civilian construction workers who were repairing the technical fence and from the Lebanese side by local shepherds. On one occasion Lebanese protesters crossed the Blue Line in the area of the Shab'a Farms, but the LAF, after being notified by UNIFIL, quickly intervened and persuaded them to return to the Lebanese side.

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II. Security arrangements

Israel continued to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon, in coordination with UNIFIL. The IDF retain a presence only in the northern part of the village of Ghajar. Given the specific status of the village of Ghajar, which is divided by the Blue Line, UNIFIL is working with the LAF and the IDF to finalize the withdrawal of the IDF from the remaining area inside Lebanon and set up temporary security arrangements for the part of the village of Ghajar inside Lebanese territory.

In parallel with the withdrawal of Israeli forces, Lebanon deployed, in coordination with UNIFIL, four brigades of its armed forces throughout the south in the areas vacated by the IDF, including along the Blue Line. The deployment of the LAF throughout the south for the first time in decades down to the Blue Line is a most notable achievement and a key stabilizing factor. The LAF, assisted by UNIFIL, have taken some specific steps to ensure that the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line is free of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and those of UNIFIL. Specifically, the LAF have established a considerable number of permanent positions and checkpoints and commenced patrols. The LAF have also demonstrated a high degree of cooperation with UNIFIL and have responded promptly to its requests.

The UNIFIL mechanism for liaison and coordination with the LAF and the IDF has been very effective in addressing military and security issues, especially through the periodic meetings of the UNIFIL Force Commander with senior representatives of the LAF and the IDF. This is a key element of UNIFIL efforts to foster stability in southern Lebanon and continues to provide an essential forum for negotiation of matters requiring the cooperation of all three parties, such as the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and temporary security arrangements for the northern part of Ghajar village. UNIFIL is engaged in discussions with the LAF and the IDF on means to further enhance liaison and coordination.

UNIFIL and the LAF have seen sporadic evidence of the presence of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and/or weapons. On one occasion, a UNIFIL demining team was challenged by two Hizbollah personnel in combat uniform carrying AK47 rifles. UNIFIL notified the LAF, who arrested three suspects the following day. Since early September, there have been 13 instances where UNIFIL came across unauthorized arms or related materiel in its area of operation. The two most noteworthy were the discovery of 17 Katyushas and several improvised explosive devices in Rachaya El-Foukhar and, in the general area of Bourhoz, of a weapons cache consisting of seven missiles, three rocket launchers and substantial amounts of ammunition. On all of these occasions, UNIFIL informed the LAF, who took prompt action either to confiscate or destroy the materials. In the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, there are, in addition, Palestinian armed elements largely confined to the refugee camps.

The Interim Maritime Task Force, under the lead of the Italian Navy, operated in support of the Lebanese Navy to secure Lebanese territorial waters until 15 October, when the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force became operational. The latter has questioned and confirmed the identity of some 950 ships, detecting one suspicious boat, which, when searched, was found to be smuggling cigarettes, and rendering assistance to one vessel in distress. As with the ground forces, cooperation

between the LAF and the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, and the Interim Maritime Task Force before it, has been of a high standard.

The Lebanese authorities reported that they had undertaken a variety of measures to secure their borders and entry points in order to prevent the illegal entry into Lebanon of arms and related materiel. However, the United Nations continues to receive reports of illegal arms smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian border, but has not been able to verify such reports.

Since my last report, I dispatched a team of border police experts as requested by the Government of Lebanon to review the measures put in place and to assess the need for technical assistance. The team reviewed the security measures and arrangements at Beirut International Airport, seaports in Beirut and Tripoli, and a few smaller ports along the coast, as well as the main land border and entry points between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Significant deficiencies were found in equipment and in training and in coordination among the four different government services responsible for the borders, as well as in compliance with some basic border security standards. The team was, however, able to confirm that the Lebanese authorities had taken initial steps to improve border security and control, including most notably the implementation of an effective integrated approach to security at the airport. I also note the presence of some 8,000 LAF troops all along Lebanon's land border with the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Government has instructed the head of the Internal Security Forces to establish a committee to review the systems in place at all border entry points and make recommendations for their improvement. That committee's preliminary findings and recommendations conform in most respects to those of the United Nations assessment team. After analysing the findings of the assessment team, the United Nations will share its observations with the Government of Lebanon. It is my understanding that the Government is also awaiting further recommendations from a German team of experts, which has been providing technical advice and assistance to the Lebanese authorities on a bilateral basis.

It is plain, however, that there is a need for bilateral assistance to the Government in order to enhance its border security capabilities. I would request that further specialized equipment and technical know-how, which has been requested by the Government of Lebanon, be provided. The provision of such assistance would be a useful confidence-building measure.

III. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Following the decision of the Security Council to supplement and enhance the UNIFIL force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, a phased deployment was planned and has largely been implemented in the area of operation between the Litani River and the Blue Line.

The first phase involved a rapid response deployment, reinforcing UNIFIL troops on the ground for the purpose of stabilizing the security situation and facilitating the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon and the concomitant deployment of the LAF throughout the south. Battalions from France, Italy and Spain deployed into the area of operation by 15 September, joining the battalions already in place from Ghana and India, and increased the overall strength of UNIFIL

to over 5,000. Italy and Spain each deployed marine infantry units to facilitate this early entry, which were later relieved in place with regular army units. Upon the completion of the first phase in mid-October, five battalions were fully deployed and operational. In addition, France has deployed one engineer unit and Belgium and Luxembourg have deployed a level-2 hospital and an engineering unit. Italian air resources were strengthened with the deployment of a UH1 helicopter, bringing the total number of helicopters to five.

The support requirement placed on the limited resources of UNIFIL has been exacerbated by the rapid flow of deployment into the area of operation and the difficulties associated with the acquisition of land, which is the responsibility of the host Government, to accommodate the incoming troops.

Responsibility for maritime operations was handed over to the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force on 15 October, under the operational control of the UNIFIL Force Commander. The Task Force consists of four frigates, 10 corvettes/fast patrol boats supported by organic helicopters and two logistics support ships with hospital facilities.

The second phase of the augmentation of UNIFIL is now under way, and involves the further deployment of four mechanized infantry battalions from France, Indonesia, Italy and Nepal and one infantry unit each from Malaysia and Qatar. The French composite battalion is assuming the role of quick reaction force. Finland, Ireland and Turkey have deployed engineer units and another is expected from Portugal. China will deploy one level-2 hospital, in addition to its existing engineering company. The Dominican Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania are expected to deploy military police companies.

As at 28 November, UNIFIL troop strength was 10,480 all ranks (see annex). The completion of the augmentation is expected by 7 December, when UNIFIL force strength will reach approximately 11,500 ground troops, 1,750 naval personnel and 51 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. With the deployment by the LAF of four brigades to south Lebanon, these numbers are deemed to be sufficient to execute the mandate.

The regular UNIFIL supply chain was recently re-established, thus enabling the Force to discontinue the air/sea bridge between Cyprus and Lebanon, which had been in place to maintain UNIFIL operability during the IDF naval and air blockade.

Structure

Command of UNIFIL in the field is exercised by the Force Commander, who is also head of the mission. My intention is to assign to the Deputy Force Commander the additional function of deputy head of the mission as a United Nations staff member. The Chief of Staff will assist the Force Commander in planning and controlling the conduct and employment of all military components. Two sector headquarters, West and East, have been established in Tibnin and Marjayoun, respectively. Each of the sectors is commanded by a brigadier general and will consist of four mechanized infantry battalions and a signal company. In addition, a quick reaction force will be based in Frun. UNIFIL air assets, provided and operated by Italy, are based at the Force headquarters. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force is operating in Lebanese territorial waters. UNIFIL will have six engineering units, as well as two level-2 hospitals and one level-1 hospital. A

UNIFIL office for coordination and joint planning with the LAF, the Ministry of Defence and other relevant Lebanese authorities is being set up in Beirut.

Another UNIFIL office will be established in Tel Aviv for liaison and coordination with IDF headquarters, the Ministry of Defence and other relevant Israeli authorities. A UNIFIL liaison office, based in the IDF Northern Command, is fully operational. The Office of Political Affairs, comprising also civil affairs and public information, is being augmented within the Force headquarters and will staff the liaison offices and also deploy at the sector level. The Strategic Military Cell for UNIFIL has been established at United Nations Headquarters and is operational.

The administrative and logistics component is being significantly reinforced in order to provide adequate and sufficient support to the Force. Troop-contributing countries were requested to deploy on a self-sufficiency basis for periods of from 15 to 60 days. Significant resources will continue to be required in the areas of engineering, transport and movement control, communications, supply and medical and administrative support.

Financial aspects

By its resolution 60/278 of 30 June 2006, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL the amount of $93.5 million gross, equivalent to $7.8 million per month, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), concurrence was granted by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to enter into commitments not to exceed $50 million to meet the most immediate and essential requirements for the expansion of UNIFIL following the recent hostilities in July and August 2006. In addition, the Advisory Committee has been informed that the UNIFIL appropriation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 as approved by the Assembly in its resolution 60/278, will be used flexibly to meet the requirements of the expanded UNIFIL.

Pending submission of the detailed budget for the expansion of UNIFIL for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, a request for commitment authority will be submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration during the regular part of its sixty-first session. The detailed budget for that period for the expanded UNIFIL will be submitted for consideration by the Assembly during its first resumed session, in March 2007.

IV. Other issues

Captured soldiers and prisoners

I continue to make the unconditional release of the captured Israeli soldiers and the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel a top priority. The facilitator appointed by me specifically to address these vital issues is currently engaged in an intensive effort with all parties to reach a resolution.

I underline my firm expectation that the necessary degree of respect for the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) and compassion for the fate of the victims will prevail. I consider it a basic moral obligation for at least humanitarian gestures to be made with the shortest delay possible.

Landmines and cluster bombs

Since my last report, the full scope of contamination from unexploded cluster munitions has come to light. As at 20 November, the National Demining Office, the LAF and the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre South Lebanon have recorded 822 cluster bomb strike sites, an 80 per cent increase since I last reported. Civilian casualties have increased to 152 as at 24 November. Of those 152 civilian victims, 17 were killed and 135 injured. The joint efforts of the teams working under the Mine Action Coordination Centre, the LAF engineering units and the UNIFIL troops have resulted to date in the clearance of more than 60,000 cluster bomblets.

Israel has yet to provide UNIFIL with the detailed firing data on its use of cluster munitions that I referred to in my previous report. The provision of this data, which would be in keeping with the spirit of Protocol V of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which came into force recently, would significantly assist operators on the ground to mitigate the threat to innocent civilians. I reiterate my expectation for the provision of these data.

I would note that Israel confirmed in a letter dated 14 November 2006 from its Chargé d'Affaires that it had handed over to the United Nations all pre-2000 minefield records available for southern Lebanon and the area north of the Litani River.

However, I regret to inform you that four deminers working for the United Nations mine clearance programme in south Lebanon have been injured over the past few days, after they stepped on Israeli-manufactured anti-personnel mines near the village of Deir Mimas. As this area was considered safe prior to the conflict, there is the possibility that new anti-personnel landmines were laid during the recent conflict. While investigations on those incidents are still ongoing, I want to reiterate that the United Nations condemns the use of all anti-personnel mines and calls upon any party that laid such mines during the recent conflict to provide information as to where they have been laid to prevent similar tragic incidents occurring in the future.

Delineation of borders

Further to the Council's request to me in paragraph 10 of its resolution 1701 (2006) to develop proposals for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border was disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shab'a Farms area, I have appointed a senior cartographer to assume the lead on reviewing relevant material and developing an accurate territorial definition of the Shab'a Farms area. The cartographer is in the process of conducting such an exercise for the purpose of any further diplomatic activity that could be carried out by the United Nations as regards this issue. I am heartened to note that both Lebanon and Israel have indicated their readiness to cooperate in this exercise.

A permanent solution of this issue remains contingent upon the delineation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, in fulfilment of resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). At the same time, and in view of the repeated Syrian statements indicating that the Shab'a Farms area is

Lebanese. I continue to take careful note of the alternative path suggested by the Government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan, namely, placing the Shab'a Farms under United Nations jurisdiction until permanent border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them is settled. The United Nations looks forward to reporting further on this matter in early 2007.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. **Annan**

Annex

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: countries providing military ground and naval contingents, as at 28 November 2006

Country	Ground	Naval	Total
Belgium	368	—	368
Bulgaria	—	130	130
China	190	—	190
Denmark	—	80	80
Finland	203	—	203
France	1 608	—	1 608
Germany	—	1 113	1 113
Ghana	661	—	661
Greece	—	225	225
India	670	—	670
Indonesia	360	—	360
Ireland	163	—	163
Italy	2 068	—	2 068
Luxembourg	2	—	2
Nepal	226	—	226
Norway	—	134	134
Poland	321	—	321
Portugal	143	—	143
Spain	1 290	—	1 290
Sweden	—	41	41
Turkey	262	232	494
Total	**8 535**	**1 955**	**10 490**

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Letter dated 30 November 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 22 November 2006 (S/PRST/2006/47), by which the Council decided to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) for a period of one year, until 31 December 2007. The Council also invited me to submit by 30 November 2006 new modalities for the mission of BONUCA for the new period.

I share the Security Council's concern over the recent deterioration of the security situation in the Central African Republic, which is aggravated not only by the ongoing rebellion in the north-eastern part of the country, but also by instability along the country's borders with Chad and the Sudan. These worrying developments constitute a serious handicap to efforts launched since the restoration of constitutional governance in 2005 to promote economic and political reforms with a view to achieving sustainable peace and development.

While primary responsibility for the improvement of conditions in the country rests with the Government and the people of the Central African Republic, the support and cooperation of the international community remains vital, not only to help consolidate progress made, but also to prevent a relapse into future conflict. The Council's decision to extend the mandate of BONUCA until 31 December 2007 therefore confirms the readiness of the United Nations to remain engaged in peace-stabilization efforts in the Central African Republic.

Accordingly, the activities of BONUCA in 2007 will focus principally on (a) supporting national reconciliation and dialogue, (b) assisting efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, (c) facilitating the mobilization of resources for national reconstruction, economic recovery, poverty alleviation and good governance, (d) mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and (e) reinforcing cooperation between the United Nations and member States of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community and other regional entities with a view to facilitating and strengthening initiatives aimed at addressing transborder insecurity in the subregion.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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Report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 2006

I. Summary

1. The Security Council mission to Afghanistan was its second since 2003 in support of the Afghan people (see S/2003/1074). It found that the Afghan partnership, begun in Bonn, Germany, in late 2001, was largely on track. The first milestone of the Bonn Agreement (see S/2001/1154) was achieved with the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. This was followed by a Constitutional Loya Jirga in January 2004, presidential elections — won by Hâmid Karzai — in November 2004 and parliamentary and provincial council elections in 34 provinces in September 2005. The Bonn Agreement was successfully concluded in December 2005 with the opening of Afghanistan's bicameral National Assembly. The following month, the Afghanistan Compact (S/2006/90, annex) — a new five-year blueprint for cooperation between the international community and the Government of Afghanistan — was launched at the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January and 1 February 2006. The successful establishment of functioning democratic institutions and efforts to improve the welfare of the population since 2001 now required consolidation to ensure that Afghanistan embarked on a period of genuine stability and development.

2. The mission noted the significant efforts undertaken by Afghans and the international community to achieve these goals. Among the major achievements in 2006, the mission noted: (a) the launch of a democratically elected National Assembly and provincial councils; (b) continuing high rates of economic growth and increasing per capita income; (c) expanding trade and investment, principally with regional partners; (d) significant infrastructure projects in road-building, power generation and transmission and watershed management; and (e) successful national programmes in education, health, rural development and the development of new Afghan security institutions.

3. Nevertheless, progress in 2006 towards realizing the vision of the Afghanistan Compact has not been as rapid as had been hoped. The past year has been characterized by uneven efforts to improve governance and establish the rule of law, intensification of the Taliban-led insurgency, an upsurge in illegal drug production and trafficking, widespread insecurity in the south and east of the country and continued impunity for criminals, corrupt officials and commanders of illegal armed groups. These factors — countered only partially by fragile State institutions —

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have tempered the legitimate hopes of Afghans with signs of despondency and disillusionment. The mission noted that the confidence of the Afghan public in its new institutions and processes was being tested. Growing insecurity in parts of the south and south-east was disrupting rehabilitation and reconstruction work by Afghans, the United Nations and other international partners.

4. Faced with these realities, the mission stressed two cardinal messages: firstly, that the firm and unyielding commitment of the international community in support of the Government and people of Afghanistan and their country's transition was unwavering; and secondly, the Afghanistan Compact, owned and led by Afghans, remains the central, strategic framework for cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. The Government of Afghanistan, with the support of the international community, must ensure its steady and faithful implementation.

II. Mission statement

5. In his letter dated 9 November 2006, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had decided to send a mission to Afghanistan (S/2006/875). The mission was conducted from 11 to 16 November 2006. The primary message of the mission was to give assurance of the continued commitment by the international community to the Afghan process and to underscore the Council's support for the Afghan efforts for security, governance and development. The mission was directed to review progress on counter-narcotics, the disbandment of illegal armed groups, human rights protection, public sector reform, justice sector reform and rule of law issues. It was also tasked with reviewing the status of international assistance. The full terms of reference, composition and programme of the mission are set out in annexes I and II to the present report.

6. The mission left New York on 9 November and returned on 17 November. During that period, the mission visited Kabul, Qalat and Mazari Sharif. The mission met with the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, the First Vice President, the Second Vice President, the Deputy Chairman of the Senate, the Attorney General, cabinet ministers, the National Security Council, governors, members of the Meshrano Jirga and the Wolesi Jirga as well as civil society, the non-governmental organization (NGO) coordinating body, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and United Nations agencies. It also received statements from Human Rights Watch (9 November) and Amnesty International (10 November). Owing to security concerns, the mission was advised not to visit Kandahar city. In Pakistan, the mission met with the Foreign Secretary, Riaz Mohammad Khan.

7. The members of the mission express appreciation to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, ISAF and UNAMA for their support and assistance during the visit.

III. Key issues

General security situation

8. The mission took place against a backdrop of nine months of growing instability. Security was the dominant concern in Afghanistan. Many of the mission's interlocutors expressed apprehension about the rise in violence in Afghanistan, especially in the south, south-east and east of the country. President Karzai contrasted the intensity of the fighting in 2006 — between Afghan and international security forces and insurgent and terrorist elements — with the relative calm of 2003 and 2004. The insurgency appeared more or less confined to one third of the country. The remaining two thirds of Afghanistan (west, north and central regions) were considered comparatively stable. However, limited factional tensions were emerging in the north and trends towards rearmament had been detected. The security situation in general remained precarious throughout the country, with the threat of suicide attacks and other forms of terrorism by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups posing a serious threat to the nation-building process.

9. After a worrying upsurge in the number of security-related incidents in the country throughout the spring and summer of 2006, there were signs that insurgent- and terrorist-related violence, which had plagued the country for much of the year, might be subsiding. The mission was told by ISAF and President Karzai's National Security Council that armed clashes between insurgents and Afghan and international military forces had decreased in October and November. ISAF Commander General David J. Richards noted that Operation Medusa in Kandahar Province in September 2006 had dealt the Taliban-led insurgency a heavy blow. He predicted that this and other recent operations by Afghan and international military forces had set the stage for a more stable winter and 2007. On the last point, however, more cautious views were expressed by UNAMA, the United Nations country team and civil society members. In any case, if there are medium-term gains, they would be dependent on the swift delivery of reconstruction, development and improved governance in insurgent-affected areas.

10. The Afghan leadership observed that the growth of the insurgency had been fed by the failure of the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to provide basic services, governance and security to rural communities. A number of interlocutors highlighted the weakness of the Afghan National Police and the rule of law as major factors contributing to the rise in instability. The President drew attention to the continued presence of unqualified former commanders in several positions of authority as a source of significant popular frustration. The National Security Adviser, Zalmai Rassoul, said that the narcotics industry was the number one problem for national security.

11. The President, a number of his senior aides, as well as parliamentarians and representatives of civil society underscored that the failure of the international community to address the issue of Taliban sanctuaries had allowed the insurgency to re-emerge. The mission took note of the Afghan view that the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be brought to a halt with the existence of sanctuaries for insurgents in neighbouring countries. Minister for Foreign Affairs Rangin Dâdfar Spantâ underscored the importance of providing a clear, unmistakable message to the population that the international community would stay the course in Afghanistan, as rumours to the contrary fuelled insecurity. To them and all other

interlocutors, the mission gave strong assurance of the continued commitment by the international community to the Afghan process and underscored the Council's unchanged support.

12. UNAMA noted that the list established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) contained some inaccuracies and observed that an updated list would be an important tool in the international fight against terrorism and for stability in the region.

International security forces

13. The mission paid tribute to the leading role that ISAF, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had assumed in contributing to security in support of the Government of Afghanistan. On 5 October 2006, ISAF assumed command of international forces in eastern Afghanistan, completing the process of expanding the ISAF area of responsibility to the entire country. The mission welcomed this newly unified command structure and commended ISAF efforts and sacrifices in the face of challenging circumstances. The mission took note of the continuing need of ISAF for adequate forces and resources to ensure the continued success of the ISAF operations. ISAF would continue to maintain its current role until Afghan national security forces and Afghan ministries no longer required assistance to provide security throughout the country.

14. The National Security Adviser, Dr. Rassoul, noted that despite unfortunate incidents such as civilian casualties, culturally insensitive raids on houses and the arrest from time to time of innocent people, there was still overwhelming support for the presence of international security forces inside Afghanistan. The Deputy Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga, Sayed Hamed Gailani, said that international security forces would need to respect the culture and religion of Afghanistan in order to retain the support of the population. It would be critical to base all operations on solid, accurate information and ensure that trustworthy elders were adequately consulted. Afghan ministers and parliamentarians called for better coordination and increased information sharing between international security forces and the Government of Afghanistan.

Security sector reform

15. The mission saluted the performance of the Afghan National Army under exceptionally difficult circumstances and in the face of heavy losses. The Secretary of the Wolesi Jirga Defence Commission noted that despite commitments to develop an army of 70,000, the Afghan National Army remained poorly equipped and understaffed. President Karzai listed strengthening the Afghan National Army as his second highest national priority. ISAF Commander General Richards raised concerns about the pressure the war had placed on the development of the Afghan National Army and noted that only 14,143 combat troops were present and available for duty earlier this fall. At the same time, he praised the strong contributions of the Afghan National Army, especially to Operation Medusa.

16. President Karzai and other Afghan interlocutors expressed frustration with the state of the Afghan National Police. The President faulted Afghanistan's international partners for inadequate and belated efforts to develop the Afghan

National Police, a failure which he claimed was partly to blame for the insecurity on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Minister of Interior, Zarar Ahmad Muqbil, observed that the Afghan National Police had been designed to provide public order in peacetime and was no longer appropriately structured given current levels of conflict, insecurity and criminality. Proposals had been made to the international community to support expansion of the Afghan National Police to meet the latest challenges of insurgency and deteriorating security in some regions.

17. The mission visited the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Qalat, Zabul Province, where it was briefed on the importance of strong recruitment, vetting and monitoring procedures for the new Afghan National Auxiliary Police. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police was intended to provide both enhanced community policing and facilitate local job creation. The Minister of Interior emphasized the importance of creating an ethnically balanced force with no ties to former commanders or illegally armed groups.

Impunity and corruption: the need for the rule of law

18. Throughout the mission, interlocutors cited corruption and the perpetuation of a culture of impunity as the root causes of popular Afghan disaffection and unease. Several international interlocutors pointed to the weak and corrupt Ministry of Interior as a key reason for the failure of the Afghan National Police. Sima Samar, the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and others pointed to widespread corruption in law enforcement and judicial institutions as central to the population's decreasing trust in the Government. Perceptions, however inaccurate, that the Taliban was less corrupt were undercutting government authority in some rural areas where access to formal justice remained limited. It was also pointed out that the continued tolerance of positions of authority given to the former commanders and warlords was contributing to instability.

19. The Afghan leadership acknowledged that the continued presence of warlords in government structures contributed to insecurity. The Government's efforts to diminish the authority of those figures would require international support. As in the case of building an effective police force, this support had not been forthcoming, despite repeated warnings and demands by the Afghan people. UNAMA noted that the Government's strategy to disband illegally armed groups was a key vehicle for dismantling the power base of those commanders who had retained the capability to have recourse to violence without official sanction. The continuing presence of some in public office with links to these groups had served to perpetuate a climate of impunity. Implementation of the programme had slowed in 2006 and a far-reaching review was now under way. It was recognized that high level international and Afghan political commitment would be the key to re-energizing the programme to disband illegally armed groups.

20. First Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud identified the fight against corruption as central to any effort to bring tangible improvements to the lives of people. In Mazari Sharif, a member of civil society cited corruption as a major source of insecurity in his region. In his presentation to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, Afghanistan's Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi noted that corruption was pervasive throughout line ministries and Government departments. President Karzai had established an anti-corruption commission two months earlier, which was now

working to identify the nature and scope of the problem. Solutions, however, remained elusive. Support and expertise would be required from Afghanistan's international partners. The report on the third meeting of the Board, attended by the mission, cited corruption at all levels of the public sector as increasing the general sense of dissatisfaction experienced by many Afghans.

21. Interlocutors stressed that any effort to confront the twin challenges of impunity and corruption would require robust rule of law institutions. The Attorney General recalled that when he had first assumed his job, tackling corruption had been his primary objective. However, he had soon discovered that the weakness, even absence, of rule of law in the provinces was the principal obstacle to change. Without functional, honest institutions or high-level political backing, the fight against corruption and impunity — no matter how popular — could not be won. He would continue his efforts to reform prosecutorial capacity in Afghanistan and to obtain convictions for corruption and other serious crimes in all parts of the country. The Chief Justice's principal message to the mission was that, in the race to establish the rule of law, time was of the essence. Visible results were required to build momentum and gain the trust of the public. The Chief Justice had removed 21 corrupt or incompetent senior justice officials and his five-year reform plan had been approved by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. Funding for the latter, however, remained as yet unsecured. UNAMA underscored that international support for rule of law would be a long-term endeavour. Detailed reform strategies were under development even as progress on physical infrastructure continued to be made and legal aid expanded across the country.

Governance: the need to build capacity and institutions

22. President Karzai identified restructuring the civil service and strengthening its capacity as the top priority for Afghanistan and its international partners. The country was in desperate need of training for professionals — doctors, lawyers, accountants and engineers. The emergence of democratic systems had raised the expectations of the Afghan people. In the long term better primary and secondary education would be the key to strengthening both the public sector and society as a whole. Representatives of NGOs and major donors echoed the call for more resources and new strategies to build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan, in particular outside Kabul. A premium was placed on enhancing human capital at all levels as a precondition for an effective public sector and sustained progress towards development goals.

23. Many Afghan interlocutors emphasized the benefits of channelling a greater proportion of international assistance through Afghanistan's core budget. Donor representatives in Kabul agreed in principle but pointed to the lack of capacity in Afghan public sector institutions to disburse funds effectively. During the mission's meeting with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and later with Afghan development ministers, interlocutors observed that "parallel administrations" had emerged — one international and one Afghan. Each had its comparative advantage, but over the long term, the latter would have to succeed if the Afghan State was to retain legitimacy and accountability. A careful balance would need to be struck between international efforts to facilitate delivery of urgently needed assistance and the longer-term imperative to strengthen the capacity of central and local government, civil society and the private sector to meet the needs of Afghan people.

First Vice President Massoud urged the international community to invest in the Government of Afghanistan. At least one major donor called for a tough and thorough assessment and reappraisal of the international community's technical assistance strategies to date.

Human rights and protection of civilians in armed conflict

24. The United Nations country team stated that following the ousting of the Taliban in 2001 space had opened for human rights and gender equality, including access to education and political posts. However, the country team was concerned that this space had recently begun to close: schools had been attacked and burned; conservative elements within the Government had failed to uphold equal rights in law; and public discourse had been restricted. The mission noted with concern suggestions that the Ministry of Women's Affairs might be abolished. It was encouraged by the statement of Meshrano Jirga's Deputy Speaker, Sayed Hamed Gailani, that any such attempt would be rejected by the parliament's Upper House.

25. Sima Samar, the head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, commended the Government for its endorsement of the Action Plan for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation and stressed the importance of reaffirming Governmental commitment to transitional justice by finally launching the Action Plan. The United Nations country team and NGOs expressed concern over the severe impact of the conflict on civilians who have been displaced, denied their right to education, wounded or killed. Dr. Samar observed that when civilians were killed as a result of the military operations by the Government or international forces it could encourage their relatives to join the Taliban. ISAF pointed out that 8 out of every 10 people killed by suicide bombers were Afghan civilians. Representatives of Afghan civil society, the country team and NGO representatives emphasized the importance of ensuring that all parties to the conflict uphold and promote international human rights law and international humanitarian law. An NGO representative stressed that human security should be an overriding concern for the Government of Afghanistan and the international community.

Development and humanitarian assistance: the challenge of coordination

26. The mission participated in the third meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board on 12 November. Afghan ministers and donor representatives noted that the Board enjoyed the trust and confidence of both the Government of Afghanistan and the international community as an oversight mechanism for the Afghanistan Compact. The Board had demonstrated a growing capacity to monitor progress and address bottlenecks hindering the implementation of Compact benchmarks. The mission welcomed the efforts of the Board and noted with encouragement that this mechanism had begun to move beyond questions of process into matters of substance. However, for the Compact to deliver visible change to the Afghan people, Government-led coordination efforts, including those of the military-led provincial reconstruction teams, would need to be strengthened and integrated under the overall Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Cabinet ministers and the United Nations country team alike emphasized the importance of

improving coordination between national level actors and those at a provincial and district level.

27. All members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board agreed that pervasive unemployment was one of the central factors contributing to instability. The first Vice President said that the creation of employment opportunities would further development and would help prevent disenchanted youth from joining the Taliban. He recognized the importance of attracting private sector investors, but noted that the lack of security deterred those whose investments were likely to generate jobs. While it was critical to accelerate the delivery of employment programmes and indeed all forms of assistance to the south and east of the country where youth are being drawn into the insurgency, interlocutors in the north noted that assistance should be extended to all 34 provinces in the country's transition from conflict to development. The Minister of Education stressed the need for education, increased rural development and longer term employment opportunities, including the reintegration of fighters into civilian life, or where appropriate into Afghan security forces, notably the Afghan National Auxiliary Police.

28. Insecurity, drought, flooding and combat operations have all combined to displace larger population groups inside Afghanistan in 2006, generating fresh vulnerabilities and new humanitarian needs. Government officials, development actors and military stakeholders all agreed that increased efforts would be needed to ensure the delivery of assistance to people living in more remote areas of Afghanistan. NGOs requested an increase in the capacity of civilian actors to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in 2007. They argued that civilian-led delivery mechanisms would allow for assistance to be better aligned to the needs and priorities of the communities affected. While accepting the need to protect humanitarian space and aid neutrality, the mission noted that insecurity or other adverse conditions meant that the military might be better placed at times to deliver basic assistance.

Counter-narcotics efforts

29. Afghanistan's burgeoning narco-economy was identified by the vast majority of the mission's interlocutors as a primary threat to stability. National Security Adviser Rassoul stressed that the narcotics industry was fast becoming the number one problem in Afghanistan. One interlocutor described it as a "cancer" that would spread and kill Afghan society over the long term. President Karzai acknowledged the severity of the threat, indicating that he would consider the use of ground spraying, but not aerial spraying, to eradicate the next poppy crop providing that international military forces provided security. The Minister for Counter-Narcotics, Habibullah Qaderi, informed the mission that in 2006 cultivation of opium poppy represented 60 per cent of the gross domestic product and that although eradication would help, poppy could only truly be countered by increased assistance to farmers and improved governance. Together with Foreign Minister Spantâ, he underscored the importance of regional and international cooperation in combating drug trafficking. President Karzai characterized the spectacular growth of poppy cultivation as a sign of desperation in the Afghan people, which would only be remedied through stronger governance as well as reconstruction and economic development.

Regional cooperation

30. A number of interlocutors underscored the importance of regional cooperation in resolving Afghanistan's challenges. At the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the mission received briefings from neighbouring States on their contributions to Afghanistan, as well as reassurances of their commitment to the Afghanistan Compact. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that his Government had invested $200 million in road construction and power supply but voiced concern over the regional drug trade. India had provided $650 million in economic assistance. Pakistan highlighted its $250 million in assistance to Afghanistan and noted that it continued to host over 2.6 million Afghan refugees. The mission welcomed the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, subsequently held in New Delhi on 18 and 19 November, as a means of facilitating development and integration.

31. Issues of security were similarly dependent on regional cooperation. Many interlocutors stressed that the existence of sanctuaries in Pakistan for the Taliban, the Hezb-I-Islami party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other insurgent groups must be addressed by law enforcement and other means. The cross-border dimension to the insurgency was also emphasized by ISAF, which cited the impact of the recent peace deal in North Waziristan, Pakistan. Over the past few months, ISAF had detected a 70 per cent and 50 per cent increase, respectively, in security incidents in the Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost, which neighbour North Waziristan.

32. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Khan, pointing out his country's burden of accepting a large number of refugees, stressed that a stable Afghanistan was essential to his country's security. He said that Pakistan was doing its best to improve the security in the border area through the deployment of 80,000 troops having suffered casualties in the operations, while admitting the difficulties in placing effective control over the long-stretched border with many crossing-points. He stressed that the cooperation among his country, Afghanistan and international forces was ongoing at various levels, including through the tripartite commission. As regards the impact of the peace deal in North Waziristan on border security, the Foreign Secretary pointed out that the assertion that the peace deal had resulted in increase in incidents did not reflect the fact on the ground. The mission encouraged Pakistan to monitor the North Waziristan agreement with a view to ensuring that the cross-border impact of this or any future agreements are positive for security and stability. The mission was encouraged by the Foreign Secretary's briefing on Pakistan's attempts to tackle terrorism and prevent Talibanization, including recent arrests in Baluchistan and plans to reinforce border security. The mission expressed concern regarding the humanitarian implications of possible contingencies to employ, even if selectively, landmines along the border to control cross-border movement.

33. The mission was encouraged by President Karzai's commitment to improving relations with Pakistan and by reassurances from Pakistani Foreign Secretary Khan that a stable Afghanistan was essential to his country's security. It was briefed on plans by Presidents Karzai and Musharraf to hold cross-border jirgas on security. These were presented as an opportunity to engage tribal leaders and build confidence and stability in the region through "people to people" contact. For his part, President Karzai expressed his hope that the entirety of Afghanistan's ethnic

and geographic diversity be represented in the jirgas. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Khan observed that the jirgas should remain "workable" in size and put a premium on the participation of communities living in regions neighbouring the border shared by the two countries.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

34. In Kabul, Zabul and Balkh Provinces, Afghan interlocutors strongly praised the work of UNAMA. This was particularly notable in Zabul, where the Governor and others welcomed the recent opening of the UNAMA sub-office in the provincial capital, Qalat. Donors similarly welcomed the expanded UNAMA presence, describing it as a "huge plus". NGOs and United Nations agencies called for UNAMA to play a greater coordination role between them and the military. The mission was briefed on the difficult circumstances under which UNAMA and the rest of the United Nations family operate in Afghanistan. Of particular note was the challenging security environment in which national and international staff members operated. Finally, the members of the mission highly commended the tireless efforts and leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Tom Koenigs, and the dedication of UNAMA and other United Nations personnel, especially those international and national staff who serve in highly insecure environments.

IV. Findings and recommendations

International commitment to Afghanistan in the face of renewed challenges

35. The mission found that the spread of insurgency, and terrorist activity by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, linked with the illegal drug trade, coupled with corruption and failures of governance and the rule of law, collectively pose a grave threat to reconstruction and nation-building in Afghanistan. However, the mission is convinced that the Government of Afghanistan and the international community have established a sound strategy to overcome these challenges. The Security Council will undertake to ensure that the international community's support for Afghanistan and its commitment to this shared strategy remain firm and enduring.

Afghanistan Compact

36. The mission welcomes the achievements of the Bonn process and reaffirms its support for the Afghanistan Compact as the best framework for cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. The Compact should now move to serious action and consistent implementation efforts under the overall guidance of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. The mission applauds the Government's ownership of the political and development process and encourages it to transform its ownership into further action with a view to striving towards the benchmarks laid out in the Compact. At the same time, Afghanistan needs additional and sustained support from the international community, both for

quick gains and for sustained progress over the long term. The mission strongly urges the international community — especially the participants in the London Conference on Afghanistan — to continue their financial and political underpinning in support of the Compact's benchmarks and the overall goals of security, good governance and economic development.

International military forces

37. The mission urges NATO and other countries to maintain and, where possible, increase their commitment to ISAF to meet the challenge of the current security environment in Afghanistan. International military forces should enhance their cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, remain committed to respecting international human rights law and international humanitarian law, avoid civilian casualties and respect local culture and traditions.

Afghan security forces and security sector reform

38. The mission affirms the importance of establishing a strong and sustainable Afghan National Army and urges donors and the Government of Afghanistan to redouble their collective efforts to establish a trusted and effective Afghan National Police throughout the country. The mission also noted the central importance of reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior. The mission concluded that considerable investment would be required before the security benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact could be achieved. In addition, the deployment of the new Afghan National Auxiliary Police must be properly funded and monitored to ensure that the new forces are fully representative of the relevant communities, responsibly led, accountable to central authorities and capable of upholding human rights. The mission calls upon the international community to revitalize its support to the increased efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to implement the programme to disband illegally armed groups.

The rule of law and good governance

39. As a matter of highest priority, the mission urges the Government of Afghanistan with the support of its international partners to establish rule of law and good governance throughout the country. To this end, the mission encourages the Government to take immediate steps to strengthen justice sector institutions and provincial government, including through the replacement of corrupt officials and local power brokers. In these efforts, the Government must enjoy the united support of the international community and adequate resources. More effective mechanisms for strategic planning, funding and coordination of rule of law programmes among international donors and agencies at the national and provincial levels are required. There is also a need to address the problem of endemic corruption within the judiciary and for a comprehensive review of judicial service. The mission calls upon donors to increase the coherence and scale of assistance in the development of Afghanistan's human capital, with special priority to be given to the reform of the country's civil service. An assessment of technical assistance efforts should be undertaken with a view to the realization of maximum use of such assistance.

Human rights and protection of civilians

40. The mission urges the Government and international community to sharpen their focus on human rights and protection of civilians, including through increased monitoring of adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law. The mission encourages the Government to reinforce its commitment to human rights and reconciliation through increased support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the implementation of the Action Plan for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Afghanistan as required by the Compact, without prejudice to the fulfilment of the measures introduced by the Security Council in its relevant resolutions. The mission urges the Government and donors to make the empowerment of women a true cross-cutting priority and to actively defend the provisions for the rights of women that are enshrined in the Constitution of Afghanistan.

Coordination and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance

41. The mission recognizes that, where possible, humanitarian and development assistance should be delivered by skilled and experienced civilian actors and notes that the capacity for civilian coordination of humanitarian assistance should be strengthened in 2007. It also recognizes that given the prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan, assistance will need to be provided by those best placed to deliver in the framework of their respective mandates. The focus should be to extend development to the provinces, strengthen accountability and reduce impunity at the community level, and achieve tangible and visible results. The international community and the Government of Afghanistan are particularly encouraged to implement programmes that generate employment given that the dearth of such opportunities contributes significantly to recruitment of insurgents. To promote such coordination, the coordination mechanism of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board should be further improved and focused on delivery.

42. Government-led coordination efforts need to be strengthened and streamlined, in particular among national Afghan institutions and all actors at the provincial and district level, with the help of UNAMA and United Nations country teams. Coordination among the Afghan leadership in government departments, the international development community and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should be enhanced and local mechanisms strengthened to ensure that Provincial Reconstruction Team assistance programmes can be led by the Government and are delivered in line with community priorities and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

Counter-narcotics

43. The mission urges the Government and the international community to further their efforts to strengthen and diversify legal livelihoods so that rural communities are able to move away from the illegal cultivation of opium poppy and pursue legitimate economic opportunities. The mission underlines the importance of the enhanced fight against the illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors within

Afghanistan and in neighbouring States and countries along trafficking routes, including increased cooperation among them to strengthen anti-narcotic controls to curb the drug flow. The Government, with support from the international community, is also called upon to step up activity to arrest and prosecute major drug traffickers regardless of their position or status, and to proceed with energetic implementation of all elements of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Regional cooperation

44. The mission reaffirms that fostering trust and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbouring and regional partners is of crucial importance for peace, security and development in the region. The mission welcomes efforts made by the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against terrorism and to reinforce border security. The mission urges both Governments to increase dialogue and collaboration in the face of a growing threat to their shared security. This will continue to require political commitment and sustained practical cooperation at all levels. The mission looks forward to the outcome of plans by the two countries to hold jirgas to improve security and stability.

Terrorism and stability

45. The mission recommends that the list established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) continue to be updated as necessary and on the basis of the most up-to-date information, as envisaged by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

46. The mission reaffirms the central and impartial role of the United Nations in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. The mission supports the ongoing expansion of UNAMA into the provinces with a view to strengthening Government and donor coordination of assistance at the provincial and local levels. In this context, the mission encourages the Secretary-General to consider measures to promote the coordination role of UNAMA both in the capital and in the country and to make recommendations in his next report. The mission recognizes the extremely difficult circumstances under which UNAMA and the rest of the United Nations family operate in Afghanistan and calls on Member States to provide all the necessary support to allow the United Nations to carry out its mandate in such a challenging environment.

Annex I

Terms of reference and composition of the Security Council visit to Afghanistan

1. The members of the Security Council have decided to send a mission to Afghanistan. The visit will take place from 9 to 17 November 2006.

Terms of reference

2. The mission has the following objectives:

- To give assurance to the Afghan society of the continued commitment by the international community to the Afghan process based on the Afghanistan Compact and Security Council resolution 1662 (2006) under Afghan leadership
- To demonstrate the Council's support for the Afghan efforts for security, governance and development by the Government, Parliament, local governments, civil society and other Afghan parties
- To review the progress in the Afghan efforts in the above areas, with particular emphasis on counter-narcotics, security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the disbandment of illegal armed groups, human rights protection, public sector reform, justice sector reform and rule of law issues in the efforts to foster regional cooperation as well as in the Afghan and international efforts in combating terrorism in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions
- To review the status of international assistance, in particular the activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, including United Nations provincial offices and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and the operation of the International Security Assistance Force, including its cooperation with the Afghan Security Forces and the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition

Composition

Kenzo Oshima (Japan), Head of mission

Martin García Moritán (Argentina)

Lars Faaborg-Andersen (Denmark)

Jean-Pierre Lacroix (France)

Adamantios Th. Vassilakis (Greece)

Abdulla Al-Sulaiti (Qatar)

Vadim Smirnov (Russian Federation)

Peter Burian (Slovakia)

Nicholas Williams (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Jackie Wolcott Sanders (United States of America)

Annex II

Programme of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan (11 to 16 November 2006)

Saturday, 11 November

1745-1810	Security briefing by the Department of Safety and Security
1945-2130	Dinner with United Nations heads of agencies and senior staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

Sunday, 12 November

0815-0915	Meeting with the Head of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
1000-1030	Meeting with President Hâmid Karzai, at the Presidential Palace
1130-1300	Participation in the morning meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1315-1410	Lunch with members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1415-1445	Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rangin Dâdfar Spantâ, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1450-1550	Joint press conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1600-1655	Meeting with the First Vice President and Cabinet Ministers on development and finance, at the Sedarat, Office of the First Vice President
1700-1730	Meeting with the Second Vice President, at the Sedarat
1745-1830	Briefing with Commander General David Richards of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Senior Civilian Representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan, Dan Everts, at ISAF headquarters
2000-2130	Dinner in honour of the members of the Security Council hosted by General Richards at ISAF headquarters

Monday, 13 November

0800-0900	Meeting with the security management team, at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conference room, UNDP compound
0900-1000	Meeting with the United Nations country team, at the United Nations Development Programme conference room, UNDP compound

1030-1115	Meeting with the Deputy Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga, Sayed Hamed Gailani, at Parliament House
1345-1430	Meeting with Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet, at the Serena Hotel
1445-1600	Meeting with Cabinet Ministers on security, at the Presidential Palace, Office of the National Security Adviser
1630-1800	Meeting with representatives of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief at the UNAMA Office of Communications and Public Information conference room
1900-2100	Reception in honour of the Security Council members hosted by Minister for Foreign Affairs Spantá

Tuesday, 14 November

0830-0850	Greetings by the United Nations regional team and move to ISAF headquarters, at Kandahar Airfield
0900-0930	Regional Command South briefing to Security Council members and the media, at Kandahar Airfield
0945-1035	Flight from Kandahar to the Provincial Reconstruction Team compound, at Qalat, Zabul Province
1040-1120	Tour for Security Council members of Qalat Provincial Reconstruction Team compound, and the Afghan National Auxiliary Police Training Centre, including computer training, medical training facilities
1120-1220	Meeting with the Governor of Zabul Province and the Council of Elders, at the Governor's guest house
1300-1340	Flight from the Qalat Provincial Reconstruction Team to Kandahar Airfield
1715-1900	Meeting with UNAMA staff, at the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
1930-2130	Reception in honour of the Security Council members hosted by the Japanese Ambassador to Afghanistan at the Serena Hotel

Wednesday, 15 November

0800-0900	Meeting with the Wolesi Jirga, Professor Burhanudin Rabani, Chairman of the Legislative Committee, at Parliament House
1000-1100	Flight to Mazari Sharif
1130-1230	Meeting with civil society, at the UNAMA office
1245-1345	Working lunch hosted by Governor Mohammad Atta, at the Governor's office
1530-1630	Flight to Kabul

1715-1815	Press Conference in the Office of Communications and Public Information conference room
1830-1945	Meeting with Ambassadors, Palace 7
2000-2130	Informal dinner, Palace 7

Thursday, 16 November

1500-1700	Meeting with the Foreign Secretary, in Islamabad

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Agenda item 100
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Letter dated 30 November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Strategy for Partnerships between States and Businesses to Counter Terrorism, which was adopted at the Global Forum for Partnerships between States and Businesses to Counter Terrorism, held in Moscow, 28-30 November 2006.

It is our hope that the Moscow Global Forum will foster the development of a full-scale international counter-terrorism cooperation process involving Government bodies and business organizations and that it will make a significant practical contribution to the implementation of the United Nations Global Strategy against Terrorism.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 100, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

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Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Strategy for Partnerships between States and Businesses to Counter Terrorism

Approved by Global Forum for Partnerships between States and Businesses to Counter Terrorism, Moscow, November 30, 2006

1. Terrorism is one of the greatest threats to civilization today. It destroys life, divides peoples, fosters conflict, weakens economies and undermines progress. It can never be justified. Just as governments and businesses co-operate to build prosperity, so they should also combine their efforts to counter terrorism. Such partnerships should be voluntary, made in a spirit of cooperation and will be based on the respective roles, responsibilities and interests of the partners.

2. This Global Forum strongly condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations regardless of when and where terrorist acts are committed or who commits them, expresses deep sympathy to the victims of the terrorist acts and their families, and acknowledges the important contribution of the United Nations and other international organizations to the prevention and countering of terrorism.

3. We must reduce both the threat of terrorism and our vulnerability to it. To reduce the threat, we need to prevent terrorist acts and disrupt terrorist activities now and to prevent new generations of terrorists. To reduce our vulnerability, we need to protect our societies against terrorist attack and minimize the consequences of attacks. However, this cannot be done by States alone. Rather, it requires joint efforts between governments, businesses and the whole of civil society.

4. This Global Forum therefore seeks to encourage and develop worldwide cooperation to promote partnerships between governments and businesses, to contribute to ensure the stability and security of economies and societies around the world. Through mutual and effective sharing of information, knowledge and experience and through joint or coordinated actions, governments and businesses can develop, improve and implement measures to prevent and counter terrorism. These partnerships are of great value in a broad range of sectors and we will demonstrate below how this Global Forum views the parameters of such partnerships in combating terrorism.

Business and Government leadership in counter terrorism

5. Financial sector: Close cooperation between businesses and governments enables the identification of the financial flows, which support terrorism. By improving the quality and mechanisms for exchanging relevant information between governments and businesses, we can enhance these efforts and methods to counter the financing of terrorism. This in turn enables us not only to freeze or otherwise disrupt financial support to terrorism, but also to prevent the use of business structures and individual enterprises for terrorist purposes and to gain intelligence about terrorists' plans, activities and connections. Through cooperation in countering terrorism, governments and businesses can better ensure the stability and security of the international financial system. By jointly assessing and sharing information on terrorist risks faced by the financial system, where appropriate, we can better protect the integrity of the financial sector, including by identifying risks linked to terrorism and working out effective schemes of insurance against such risks, as appropriate. Measures developed by the international community, notably the FATF, are of utmost importance in this context.

6. Telecommunications and Information security: To reduce vulnerability of critical information systems to electronic attack by terrorists, governments and businesses should work together to develop and improve arrangements and methods, and ensure that best practices are promoted. Increased cooperation would also allow information and alerts to be efficiently shared between relevant actors, and ensure that any response to an electronic attack is swift and co-ordinated. While collection of data from terrorist use of telecommunications and the Internet can be invaluable to police and intelligence services, it can also threaten the privacy of individual law-abiding citizens. Governments and businesses should work closely to ensure that proper lawful procedures are followed concerning the collection, retaining and handling of such data.

7. Internet: Internet service providers and other businesses can work with governments to counter the misuse of the Internet by terrorists and to prevent the facilitation of the final steps from extremism to terrorism. For example, terrorists have used the Internet with the aim to recruit and to instruct people on how to mount attacks and to incite them to commit terrorist acts. Governments should therefore, as appropriate, look at building closer voluntary national and international partnerships with Internet service providers to tackle such abuses.

8. Tourism: The tourism industry in some regions is a priority target for terrorists and should be protected through joint efforts of governments and businesses involved, including through appropriate and timely exchange of information about potential terrorist threats to specific regions and tourist destinations.

9. Critical infrastructure must be preserved and protected. Attacks on energy, communications, chemical and other hazardous industries, food, water, educational institutions and health-care sectors could seriously threaten health and safety and disrupt supply and economic activity. Some sectors, such as energy and chemicals, could themselves be exploited by terrorists to threaten the broader community. To ensure protection against terrorism, it is vital that governments and businesses active in these sectors cooperate effectively, including through intense exchange of information and expertise. Some regulation may be reasonable to ensure a sufficient level of protective security in the interest of all. However, in many cases the best result is achieved by voluntary co-operation, such as through joint simulations and exercises. When protecting critical infrastructures against terrorism, other threats and risks should also be taken into consideration in order to assure rational and effective protection [all hazards approach].

10. Transportation: While there is already extensive co-operation between governments and airlines on international and domestic aviation security, there is still room to deepen and broaden this cooperation, for example regarding illegal air transport of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and their munitions. Moreover, there remains great potential to develop joint cooperative work on maritime, rail and other ground transport security issues between governments and businesses to improve safety and preparedness.

11. International Trade Supply Chain: Co-operation between governments and businesses is vital to lessening the vulnerability of the international trade supply chain to terrorist attacks. Partnerships between the public and business sector could provide trade facilitation benefits to participating businesses in exchange for meeting minimum security criteria. Governments should encourage Customs-Business partnerships to promote supply chain security based on existing international standards and best practices.

Emergency Preparedness and Consequence Management

12. Threat assessments: Joint assessment of terrorist threats and the effective dissemination of such information, including to the public and to businesses, helps those actors make sensible decisions about security and preparedness.

13. Consequence management: Governments should work with businesses to encourage and spread best practices on consequence management and business continuity. They can also cooperate to work out ways to improve assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and their families.

14. Emergency response network: While the majority of the emergency response network are in the public sector, businesses can contribute significantly to emergency response. As

it is vital that these efforts be well coordinated, joint anti-terrorist exercises should be conducted whenever possible.

Critical linkages

15. Economic development: Businesses can contribute to fostering economic development by providing jobs and improved access to goods and services to underserved and underdeveloped communities.

16. Charitable sector: Businesses and governments should work together to prevent and minimize abuse by terrorists in this sector, while preserving the legitimate rights and activities of these organizations. This is best achieved through close co-operation between authorities and other competent bodies and charities, as well as through enhanced public transparency regarding sources and disposition of charitable funds. Public bodies can also provide training and guidance to help charities protect themselves against terrorist abuse.

17. Academic sector: The academic and commercial scientific communities have key roles to play in developing and implementing new technology to enhance protective security, but also in conducting research on terrorism-related issues, including structural and other factors that can encourage radicalization and terrorist recruitment. Governments should encourage joint, individual or coordinated scientific research with academic communities and businesses on terrorism-related issues. Governments and businesses can also promote moderation, tolerance and social inclusion through educational and other exchange programs.

18. Media can play a major role in promoting moderation, tolerance, social inclusion, and in isolating terrorists, by fostering open and well-informed debate and by countering the motivational factors, which promote extremism - conflict, propaganda, prejudice. At the same time, governments should ensure that their counter-terrorism efforts are understood by the media and the general public.

* * *

19. The more governments and businesses work together at national and international levels to help build these partnerships, the stronger and more effective they will be. To this end, we will contribute to establishing informal international government-business working groups on counter-terrorism partnerships in key sectors. Within the framework of a number of preparatory working meetings several specific proposals for antiterrorist partnerships between states and businesses to counter terrorism have already been presented. On the basis of the discussions held at this Forum, these informal international

government-business working groups will seek to work out and put into practice proposals and concrete projects of cooperation between states and businesses to counter terrorism. Interested state and private structures, as well as relevant or specialized international organizations, as appropriate, will take part in the elaboration and implementation of these proposals and projects on a voluntary basis. The working groups will report the results of their deliberations to a second meeting of this Forum.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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Sixty-first session
General Assembly
Agenda item 13
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 4 December 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical table showing the number of Israeli violations committed during November 2006 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 13, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the identical letters dated 4 December 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statistical table showing the number of Israeli violations committed during November 2006

Air violations				*Sea violations*	*Land violations*			*Total violations*	*Total violations in previous month*
					Military acts of aggression	*Field violations*	*Breaches*		
Military jet	Reconnaissance	Helicopter	Total	Crossing of territorial waters, artillery fire and shooting of flares and fire-bombs over territorial waters	Air raids, artillery shelling, shelling of military positions and important centres, attacks on and killing of civilians	Gunfire, shooting of flares, dropping of artillery missiles, infiltration and crossing of international borders	Threats and displaying of weapons, bulldozing of soil, placing of barbed wire and setting up of installations inside Lebanese territory		
21	44	1	66	8	-	16	6	96	85

United Nations S/2006/938

Security Council

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4 December 2006

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

(for the period from 10 June 2006 to 1 December 2006)

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past six months pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 1685 (2006) of 13 June 2006.

II. Situation in the area and activities of the Force

2. During the period under review the ceasefire in the Israel-Syria sector was maintained and the UNDOF area of operation remained generally quiet except in the Shab'a Farms (area 6), which experienced activity originating from the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), described in my reports on UNIFIL. In particular, between 12 July and 14 August 2006, rockets originating from the UNIFIL area of operation hit close to UNDOF installations, destroying one United Nations unmanned watchtower. Also, unidentified elements operating from the UNDOF area of separation detonated an explosive along the A-Line and destroyed a small portion of the technical fence.

3. UNDOF supervised its area of separation by means of fixed positions and patrols to ensure that military forces of either party were excluded from it. The Force also carried out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the areas of limitation. Liaison officers from the party concerned accompanied the inspection teams. As in the past, both sides denied inspection teams access to some of their positions and imposed restrictions on the Force's freedom of movement. From 12 July to 14 August 2006, the Force temporarily restricted its patrolling and inspection activities in areas 4, 5 and 6, adjacent to the UNIFIL area of operation. Israeli national customs officials continued to operate at the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) post at the UNDOF crossing gate between the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

4. The Force continued to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross with the passage of persons through the area of separation. During the past six months, UNDOF assisted in the crossing of 727 students, 1,009 pilgrims and 6 civilians, provided protection at one wedding and facilitated the passage of a body

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for burial. In addition, the Force assisted in the handover from the IDF to the Syrian authorities of three Syrian civilians who had crossed into the Israeli-occupied Golan.

5. In the area of operation, especially in the area of separation, mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. Owing to the age of the mines and their deteriorating explosives, this threat has increased. UNDOF continued to carry out operational mine clearance. UNDOF remained available to support the United Nations Children's Fund in activities to promote mine awareness among the civilian population.

6. The Force Commander and his staff maintained close contact with the military authorities of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. Both sides generally cooperated with the Force in the execution of its tasks.

7. As at 15 November 2006, UNDOF comprised 1,025 troops, from Austria (372), Canada (2), India (190), Japan (30), Nepal (2), Poland (334) and Slovakia (95), respectively. A total of 15 personnel were employed by Japan as a national support element. In addition, 83 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks. A map showing the deployment of the Force is attached to the present report.

III. Financial aspects

8. By its resolution 60/277 of 30 June 2006, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $39.9 million gross, equivalent to $3.3 million gross per month, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 December 2006, as recommended in paragraph 13 below, the cost of maintaining the Force will be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.

9. As at 30 September 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNDOF special account for the period from the inception of the Force to 30 September 2006 amounted to $30.2 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at the same date amounted to $2,080.2 million. As at 31 October 2006, amounts owed to troop contributors totalled $2.4 million. Reimbursement of troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the period up to 31 August and 31 March 2006, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

10. The Security Council, when deciding in its resolution 1685 (2006) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 31 December 2006, also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973), and requested the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of the period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and in particular the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/61/298) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 60/40 and 60/41.

V. Observations

11. The situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained generally quiet. UNDOF, which was established in May 1974 to supervise the ceasefire called for by the Security Council and the agreement on disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its function effectively, with the cooperation of the parties.

12. Nevertheless, the situation in the Middle East is tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

13. Under the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2007. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

14. In making this recommendation, I must draw attention to the shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some $30.2 million. The sum represents money owed to the Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears.

15. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Lieutenant General Bala Nanda Sharma and to the men and women serving with UNDOF and UNTSO. They have performed with efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those which provide the UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force.


وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لمراقبة فض الاشتباك في كانون الأول/ديسمبر ٢٠٠٦
2006 年 12月观察员部队的部署
UNDOF DEPLOYMENT AS OF DECEMBER 2006
DEPLOIEMENT DE LA FNUOD AU MOIS DE DÉCEMBRE 2006
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ СООННР ПО СОСТОЯНИЮ НА ДЕКАБРЬ 2006
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FNUOS EN DICIEMBRE 2006
LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
JORDAN
GOLAN HEIGHTS
HQ UNDOF
AUSTRIA / SLOVAKIA
LOG INDIA / JAPAN
HQ OOG
MP "B"
STS AUSTRIA / SLOVAKIA
STS POLAND
POLAND
LOG INDIA / JAPAN
Camp Ziouani
MP "A"
MP "C"
AUSBATT
POLBATT
Camp Faouar
Line "Alpha"
Line "Alpha 1"
Line "Bravo"
United Nations observation post
Poste d'observation de l'ONU
Наблюдательный пункт ООН
Puesto de observación de las Naciones Unidas
United Nations position
Position de l'ONU
Позиция ООН
Posición de las Naciones Unidas
Inter-battalion boundary
Limite entre des bataillons de la Force
Разделительная линия между батальонами
Limites entre batallones de la Fuerza
联合国观察所
联合国部队的位置
各营之间界限
PALESTINE BELT GRID
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Map No. 2916 Rev. 62 UNITED NATIONS
December 2006
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2006/939

Security Council

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Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1603 (2005), by which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of developments in Côte d'Ivoire and in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The report covers developments since my report of 17 October 2006 (S/2006/821).

II. Political developments

2. While it was welcomed in the subregion as a major step forward, Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) received mixed reactions from the Ivorian parties. On 2 November, President Laurent Gbagbo delivered an address to the nation in which he welcomed the resolution, but added that those of its provisions that were "inconsistent with the Constitution" of Côte d'Ivoire would not be implemented. Subsequently, the President announced that he was conducting a series of consultations with various segments of Ivorian society, including religious and traditional leaders, youth and women's organizations, and the business community, with a view to developing an "alternative framework" for resolving the Ivorian crisis. In that regard, the President expressed the view that all the peace plans devised by the international community since the conflict started had failed and that the Ivorian people therefore had the responsibility to find "their own solution". This course of action was generally perceived as an attempt to walk away from resolution 1721 (2006).

3. On 3 November, the Chief of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI), General Philippe Mangou, made a radio/television broadcast in which he assured President Gbagbo of the support of the Defence and Security Forces. General Mangou also welcomed the President's initiative to hold consultations with the various segments of the population and called upon the Forces nouvelles to return to the negotiation table. On 18 November, supporters of President Gbagbo, united under the umbrella group, the National Resistance Council for Democracy (CNRD) issued a statement presenting their views on the resolution of the crisis. The statement called for the appointment of a new prime minister by the President; the separation of the identification process from the preparation of the electoral rolls; the lifting of the zone of confidence; and the withdrawal of the French Licorne force.

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4. For their part, the Forces nouvelles issued a statement on 2 November 2006 in which they welcomed resolution 1721 (2006), saying that it addressed their major concerns. The coalition of the opposition parties, Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix, similarly welcomed the resolution and called on its supporters to boycott the consultations initiated by President Gbagbo.

5. In an address to the nation on 8 November, Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny expressed his determination to implement resolution 1721 (2006) and stated that there was no need for another framework to resolve the Ivorian crisis. He also announced that he intended to focus on the outstanding tasks assigned to him, in particular disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion; identification of the population; dismantling of the militia; restructuring of the army; redeployment of state administration; and preparations for the elections. In that regard, the Prime Minister indicated that he would take all necessary measures to relaunch as soon as possible the disarmament programme and to establish a new structure for the military dialogue between the Forces nouvelles and FANCI.

6. The opposition parties and the Forces nouvelles commended the resolve shown by the Prime Minister in his 8 November statement and pledged their full support to him in the implementation of his peace mission. Similar sentiments were expressed by several civil society groups, who urged the Prime Minister to move expeditiously to implement resolution 1721 (2006).

7. On 7 November, I sent letters to President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo and President Mamadou Tandja of the Republic of the Niger, the current chairmen of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), respectively, requesting them to intervene personally in order to secure the acceptance of the resolution by all the parties and avert the new developing stalemate. I also emphasized that it was imperative for the Ivorian political leaders to immediately open a dialogue aimed at reaching consensus on a flexible way to implement resolution 1721 (2006).

8. My Special Representative, Pierre Schori, along with the High Representative for the elections, Gérard Stoudmann, and the Special Representative of the African Union Mediator, General Jean-Marie Mokoko, engaged in extensive consultations with the main Ivorian parties and the local media to impress upon them the need to implement resolution 1721 (2006) in good faith and in full. They also met with the Prime Minister in Yamoussoukro on 12 November to discuss the next steps. The Prime Minister reaffirmed his determination to implement the resolution, but stressed that this required the necessary political will from all the parties. The Prime Minister also requested UNOCI and other international partners to assist the Government to develop a plan for the implementation of the new transition process. President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny held a private meeting on 23 November, facilitated by the Special Representative of the International Organization of la Francophonie, Lansana Kouyaté, to discuss the way forward in setting the new transition process into motion.

9. In keeping with paragraph 21 of resolution 1721 (2006), the day-to-day mediation group met on 8 November, under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the African Union Mediator and with the participation of my Special Representative, the High Representative for the elections, the Special Representatives of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and a representative of the International Organization

of la Francophonie. The mediation group has so far held four meetings since the adoption of resolution 1721 (2006). The meetings discussed how best to assist the Prime Minister in preparing a road map for the new transition period. To that end, the mediation group decided to develop a new draft implementation schedule, which will be presented to the Prime Minister and the next ministerial meeting of the International Working Group established by the Security Council under resolution 1633 (2005), scheduled to take place on 1 December.

10. Despite the efforts to encourage the Ivorian leaders to open a constructive dialogue and work together to relaunch the implementation of the identification and disarmament processes and the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country, the political atmosphere appeared to be deteriorating, with deepening disagreements between the President and the Prime Minister. On 23 November, the national commission of inquiry into the toxic waste scandal submitted its final report, in which it confirmed that the Minister of Transport, the General Manager of the Port of Abidjan, the Director-General of Customs and the Governor of the District of Abidjan, should be held accountable for the dumping of toxic waste from a foreign vessel in July 2006. Those officials had already been suspended from their respective posts by the Prime Minister on 6 and 14 September.

11. However, on 26 November, President Gbagbo issued presidential decrees limiting the suspension of the officials to three months, until 16 December. On 27 November, the Office of the Prime Minister broadcast a statement on national television stating that the Prime Minister had not been consulted on the decrees, that the matter should have been discussed within the Government and that the President's decisions were contrary to the principles of good governance, transparency and justice and would represent a major impediment in the fight against impunity. On 26 November, President Gbagbo also dismissed the Director-General and the entire board of the government newspaper *Fraternité Matin*, after the newspaper printed an article expressing the view that resolution 1721 (2006) was the only way out of the crisis.

12. In the early hours of 28 November, elements of the Defence and Security Forces entered the premises of the state-owned Radio Télévision Ivorienne (RTI) by force and prevented a repeat broadcast of the Prime Minister's statement. On the same day, in a major confrontational step, President Gbagbo issued a decree dismissing the Director-General and the management board of the RTI. The situation deteriorated, with demonstrations organized in several towns to protest against the President's decisions. In addition, on 1 December, the Republican Guard blocked the UNOCI unit in charge of the Prime Minister's security from access to the Prime Minister's compound.

13. The International Working Group met in Abidjan on 1 December. The Group noted with deep concern the delays in implementing resolution 1721 (2006). It also condemned the dismissals at the RTI, noting that they were contrary to the Pretoria Agreement, as undermining the neutrality and impartiality of the public media as well as freedom of expression. It considered indispensable the reinstatement of the officials.

14. The Working Group also set out the main timelines for relaunching the disarmament and identification processes, the preparations for the elections, as well as the commencement of the reform of the security sector. It further condemned obstructions to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, in particular the

refusal by the Republican Guard to grant the UNOCI unit in charge of the Prime Minister's security access to his compound. Reacting to the communiqué of the Working Group on 3 December, President Gbagbo said that it strengthened his resolve to develop an alternative solution to the Ivorian crisis. He added that he would inform me and the Security Council of the "dangerous stance" taken by the Working Group.

III. Security situation

15. The security situation has remained relatively calm following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1721 (2006). However, violent clashes, unrelated to reactions to the resolution, occurred in Yopougon, near Abidjan, on 1 and 3 November 2006, when the local population reacted to criminal harassment by the Groupement des patriotes pour la paix (GPP) militia and the support the militia was receiving from the Defence and Security Forces. At least five people were killed during the clashes, including two militiamen who were burned alive by Yopougon residents. The situation calmed down after the Defence and Security Forces relocated the militia elements, numbering about 200, to the gendarmerie barracks in another part of Abidjan.

16. On 10 November, in Yamoussoukro, a group of youth affiliated with the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix blocked a convoy of supporters of the presidential camp en route to Abidjan to attend President Gbagbo's consultations. Clashes broke out and two people were wounded. The Defence and Security Forces used tear gas to disperse the crowd. On 20 November, a few days before the release of the report of the national commission of inquiry into the toxic waste scandal, elements of the Young Patriots blocked the access to the Abidjan autonomous port, demanding that the Director-General of the port, suspended by the Prime Minister in September, be reinstated. The Defence and Security Forces dispersed the group.

17. On 6 November 2006, in the western town of Duékoué, militias who were demonstrating to demand payment of the first instalment of their disarmament benefits (safety net allowance) from the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (PNDDR), seized a UNOCI vehicle. The incident was resolved following the intervention of UNOCI and the local authorities. Obstruction to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces by militias in the west was reported during the period under review. Meanwhile, in the north, a significant rise in the crime rate was reported, in particular in Bouaké and Korhogo, while ethnic tensions rose in the zone of confidence and in the south-west of the country, leading in particular to the killing of five persons around the village of Blodi during clashes between Burkinabé and Guéré, prompting increased patrolling by UNOCI and the French Licorne force in those areas.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Force deployment and activities

18. As at 20 November, the troop strength of UNOCI stood at 8,042 military personnel, consisting of 11 battalions (5 in Sector West, 4 in Sector East and 2 in Abidjan), one aviation unit, three engineering companies and one transport company

providing support to the battalions. In order to minimize the risk of escalation of the prevailing political tensions in the country, in particular in Abidjan, the force is actively engaged in extensive operational activities, in close cooperation with the French Licorne force. The force conducts an average of 120 patrols per day over the entire theatre of operations, as well as large-scale operations in Abidjan and in the western part of the country, aimed at dominating their areas of responsibility and monitoring the security situation. The force has also undergone a training programme aimed at enhancing its crowd control capacity, in close coordination with the Operation's formed police units. The UNOCI and Licorne force commanders continue to hold monthly meetings with the Chief of Staff of the FANCI, General Mangou. In the meantime, UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) continue to conduct simultaneous patrols of the border areas in order to prevent illegal cross-border movements of arms and combatants.

19. Enhanced cooperation between the UNOCI and French Licorne forces in the whole theatre, and notably Abidjan, has culminated in several quick reaction force rehearsals conducted with the Licorne force, which were repeated after each rotation of contingents. At the end of October, as part of the tripartite monthly meetings involving representatives of UNOCI, the Licorne force and the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, the Chief of Staff of the FANCI agreed, in principle, to resume joint patrols in Abidjan.

20. During the new transition period, it will be essential to adjust the overall posture of the UNOCI military component. In particular, the Force will gradually reduce its presence in the zone of confidence, as appropriate, shift from the current emphasis on separating the armed groups and increase its presence and mobility throughout the country, with a view to enhancing its role in providing security for the resumption of the mobile courts and to the cantonment, demobilization and disarmament sites, securing the electoral process, providing technical assistance to the restructuring of the armed forces, strengthening the protection of civilians and facilitating freedom of movement, especially between the north and the south. To that end, and for the reasons provided in my eighth report, of 3 January 2006 (S/2006/2), I once again urge the Security Council to authorize the deployment of the remaining three battalions out of the four recommended in that report. In addition, the Sous-Groupement de sécurité, which provides security to the signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and members of the Government will be required to provide security for the members of the Electoral Commission and for the High Representative for the elections. It is therefore imperative to reinforce this unit by 250 additional gendarmes.

Police deployment

21. As at 20 November, the strength of the police component of UNOCI stood at 1,004 personnel, including 379 United Nations police officers and 625 personnel from five formed police units, against an authorized police effective of 1,200 personnel. The shortfall is due to the delayed deployment of one formed police unit, which is expected to arrive in the area in January 2007. The United Nations police officers are deployed throughout the country at 22 team sites, in the north and south of the zone of confidence, and within the zone. Two formed police units are deployed in Abidjan, one in Bouaké, one in Daloa and one in Yamoussoukro, while the fifth will be deployed in Guiglo.

22. During the period under review, the joint patrols conducted between United Nations police and the internal security forces (police and gendarmerie) of Côte d'Ivoire, which resumed in June 2006, have been gradually extended to the entire area controlled by the Government, south of the zone of confidence. In the near future, UNOCI intends to launch similar patrols in the area controlled by the Forces nouvelles jointly with the auxiliaries of police who have been trained by UNOCI. During the period ahead, the United Nations police will also continue to interact with the internal security forces of Côte d'Ivoire involved in police training at the various police and gendarmerie schools and academy centres and will be involved in the restructuring of the security sector.

23. With the anticipated resumption of the mobile court hearings, the United Nations police will continue to provide assistance to the UNOCI Electoral Division, including by participating in UNOCI observer teams deployed at the mobile court sites. The formed police units will also continue to provide security at mobile court sites in their five main areas of deployment in Abidjan, Daloa, Guiglo, Yamoussoukro and Bouaké. Formed police units will also continue to provide enhanced security for UNOCI personnel and premises and to conduct joint training and exercises on crowd control management with the mission's military contingents, in close collaboration with elements from the mobile gendarmerie unit of the Licorne force.

V. Steps needed to relaunch the key processes under the road map

24. Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) provided a sound framework for the relaunching of the key processes that had been stalled since August 2006, including the disarmament process, the dismantling and disarmament of the militias, the mobile court hearings, the re-establishment of state authority and the technical preparations for the elections. In this regard, the parties should focus, in a pragmatic manner, on resolving the outstanding issues in order to facilitate the resumption of the key processes without any further delay.

Concomitant resumption of identification and disarmament processes

25. The resumption of the identification and disarmament processes should build upon the experience gained during the pilot project launched by Prime Minister Banny in May 2006 and the subsequent initial concomitant operations of the mobile courts and the pre-cantonment process in July 2006. That experience demonstrated the feasibility of the approach developed during this important phase. In order to relaunch the mobile courts, the outstanding disagreements on the procedures for issuing certificates of nationality must be resolved expeditiously. In this regard, the decree issued by President Gbagbo on 5 October, which increased the number of jurisdictions competent to deliver certificates of nationality to 147, should form the basis for resolving this matter. The final call for bids for the operator who will be responsible for implementing the technical aspects of the identification process (data collection and sorting, production of identification cards and voter cards) is also an encouraging step towards relaunching the identification process.

26. However, further steps are necessary. For instance, it should be recalled that, with only 23 courts currently functioning, the Government is facing the daunting task of organizing the work of the new courts. Technical delays have already put a

tight timeline under further stress. It is unfortunate, for example, that the selection of the operator mentioned above has still not been made. It will also be essential to provide adequate funding and the requisite logistical resources to ensure sustained operation of the mobile courts and other aspects of the identification process, once they resume. In this regard, UNOCI could contribute to the successful conduct of the identification process by providing limited logistical support, as appropriate and within currently available resources, especially for the operation of the mobile courts.

27. In order to ensure that the identification process is conducted in a transparent, credible and coordinated manner and is consistent with international standards, the working group on the identification of the population and the registration of voters provided for in resolution 1721 (2006) should be established without delay under the authority of the Prime Minister. The participation of representatives of all the Ivorian parties, as well as UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections in this important working group will be critical to ensuring the transparency of the identification process.

28. The principle of conducting the disarmament and identification processes concomitantly, agreed upon by the Ivorian parties, should be preserved. In order to expedite the disarmament process and in view of the assurances given by the respective forces that the pre-cantonment of their troops was completed in July 2006, it has been proposed that the disarmament process should be relaunched at the cantonment phase. In this regard, the verification, screening and profiling of combatants and the listing of their weapons would now be carried out during the cantonment phase of the programme. This proposal is aimed at avoiding the logistical difficulties that plagued the implementation of the pre-cantonment phase in July 2006. The cantonment operations would be conducted at 17 cantonment sites, including 9 in the area controlled by the Forces nouvelles and 8 in the area controlled by the Government. The PNDDR had planned to complete the physical rehabilitation of the facilities at the cantonment sites by the end of December. However, the Programme is facing a shortfall of approximately $10 million for the procurement of the necessary equipment for those sites.

29. The initial pilot phases of the disarmament process, which were conducted between May and August 2006, exposed capacity and resource constraints in the PNDDR, which could be addressed by strengthening UNOCI's role in the implementation of the Programme. I therefore recommend that UNOCI be authorized to provide direct assistance to the PNDDR in refurbishing and equipping the cantonment sites. Such assistance would ensure the timely relaunching of the Programme and thus preserve the politically sensitive principle of conducting the disarmament of combatants and the identification of the population concomitantly. The proposed enhanced role of UNOCI would have financial implications for the mission. In addition, as indicated in my ninth progress report on UNOCI (S/2006/532), the World Bank continues to withhold the $80 million it had pledged to contribute towards the cost of the reintegration of demobilized combatants, because of the Government's unpaid arrears. This issue has been outstanding for some time and is not likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. I therefore appeal to Member States to contribute individually the funds required to meet that shortfall, which could jeopardize the effective implementation of the Programme. In this regard, it should be noted that any delays in the implementation of the

disarmament and identification processes could have a negative impact on the election schedule.

30. In order to facilitate the timely resumption of the disarmament process, it is also imperative that the PNDDR and UNOCI receive the lists of combatants and weapons from the Forces nouvelles and the FANCI before the resumption of the disarmament programme. To that end, Prime Minister Banny should set a deadline for the submission of this critical information, to be followed by a quick verification phase, conducted by the parties together with the impartial forces. Work on reintegration opportunities to be provided to ex-combatants should also begin without delay, so as to ensure that there is no gap between the disarmament and reintegration programmes. In this regard, the PNDDR should pursue its plan to establish a network with local authorities and civil society, which would enhance the sustainability of the reinsertion process.

Dismantling and disarmament of militias

31. As reported in my tenth progress report on UNOCI (S/2006/821), the dismantling and disarmament of the militias was suspended in early August by the PNDDR as a result of a low weapon-to-combatant ratio and the high number of unserviceable weapons surrendered by the 981 disarmed militia members. In addition, the leaders of the militias in the west were demanding the inclusion of 3,000 additional individuals in the disarmament programme, under which they would be entitled to receive a safety net allowance of $900. However, the PNDDR rejected that demand, stressing that the eligible 2,000 militias should surrender a credible number of weapons, in keeping with the established weapons-to-combatant ratio. Once these outstanding issues are resolved and if the outstanding caseload of eligible militia members remains at 1,000, based on the previously agreed framework, it would take only two weeks to disarm the militias in the west. The establishment of two additional disarmament sites in Toulépleu and Bloléquin, as proposed by UNOCI, would help expedite this process.

32. In order to facilitate the early relaunching of the process, the PNDDR, in consultation with UNOCI, should expeditiously issue clear criteria and procedures for the disarmament of the remaining armed militias. In addition, the status of the militias in Abidjan, in particular the GPP, whose command and control structure remain intact, despite claims that they were dismantled by the Defence and Security Forces in 2005, needs to be clarified by the PNDDR and subsequently verified. Effective sensitization on the criteria for dismantling the militias should be conducted for all concerned groups and adequate measures, involving in particular the Defence and Security Forces, should be envisaged to prevent the re-emergence of the militia groups. The early establishment of the military unit intended to provide direct support to the Office of the Prime Minister for this purpose would also contribute to progress on the issue.

Restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces

33. As envisaged in resolution 1721 (2006), the disarmament programme should be placed in the broader context of the restructuring of the armed forces. The Prime Minister has yet to announce the establishment of the working group provided for in resolution 1721 (2006) to prepare the plan for the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces. The envisaged plan is expected to address such issues as the overall

role and strength of the armed forces and their deployment throughout the country, criteria for recruitment and assignments, career development and entitlements for soldiers and their families, as well as the integration of elements from the Forces nouvelles. The restructuring programme should also include other components of the Defence and Security Forces (gendarmerie, police and intelligence services), while a review of the legislative and executive framework governing the security sector should be addressed in a holistic and transparent manner. UNOCI is expected to provide technical assistance to the restructuring programme. I urge Member States in a position to do so to offer the Government assistance in developing and implementing its plans in this vital area.

Redeployment of state administration

34. The National Committee for the Restoration of State Authority (CNPRA) has indicated that at least half of the 24,437 civil servants displaced by the crisis had been redeployed by October 2006, with 3,962 civil servants redeployed in the west and 8,424 civil servants in the central, eastern and northern parts of the country. The redeployment of the remaining 12,091 civil servants was impeded in part by the funding gap of $30 million needed for the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the payment of allowances to the civil servants concerned. In addition, the Forces nouvelles should not place any preconditions for the return of civil servants to the north and should guarantee their security. In this connection, the CNPRA is expected to submit a revised redeployment plan. During preliminary consultations, the Minister for Territorial Administration submitted a provisional $25 million budget to support the redeployment of civil servants to the north.

35. To be sustainable, the redeployment of state administration should also include the redeployment of the judiciary in the zone of confidence and in the north. UNOCI intends to increase the presence of civil affairs and rule of law officers throughout the country to support this process.

Technical preparations for the elections

36. The Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission has informed UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections of his intention to establish all 430 local structures of the Commission (24 regional, 48 departmental and 358 local) as soon as possible, regardless of whether all parties eligible will be in a position to nominate their representatives to those bodies as currently envisaged. He has also created 10 technical subcommissions within the central electoral commission in order to begin detailed planning for the elections, with the support of 10 experts from UNOCI.

37. Within a short time frame, the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission is also expected to determine the dates for the holding of the first round of presidential elections. In the meantime, UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections will continue to assist their Ivorian counterparts in the efforts to streamline the processes leading to the elections, in particular with regard to the number of commissioners in the local commissions to be established by the Independent Electoral Commission throughout the country. UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections will also support the fund-raising efforts of the Government in order to ensure that adequate resources are made available for the

preparations for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire. The budget for the elections is estimated at $95 million.

38. In view of the inadequate resources received from donors for the office of the High Representative for the elections, I had indicated in my tenth progress report on UNOCI (S/2006/821) my intention to seek the approval of the General Assembly to fund his office from assessed contributions. I am pleased to report that an alternative source of funding has been identified, through the United Nations Trust Fund for Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Activities. However, continued support to the activities of the High Representative will be needed from donors through contributions to the Trust Fund.

VI. Humanitarian situation

39. The humanitarian situation continues to be a source of concern. The health situation continues to be deteriorating, with new reports of cholera and yellow fever outbreaks as well as continued shortages of water and sanitation in the northern part of the country. In addition, a census conducted by the United Nations Population Fund and the Government concluded that 710,000 internally displaced persons lived in five regions of the area controlled by the Government, putting the overall numbers of internally displaced persons in the country at approximately 800,000.

40. During the period under review, UNOCI and the United Nations country team continued to provide coordinated assistance to the Government's efforts to mitigate the humanitarian and health consequences of the dumping of toxic waste from a foreign ship, in Abidjan, at the end of August. As at 23 October 2006, 10 people were reported to have died, 64 persons had been hospitalized and 104,000 patients had sought health consultations. Following the deployment of a United Nations disaster assistance and coordination team in response to a request by the Government for international assistance, a joint mission was fielded by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, from 22 to 29 November 2006, to identify the support needed by the Government in establishing a toxic waste contingency plan and an action plan.

41. On 12 and 13 October 2006, a workshop on the protection of civilians took place in Abidjan, with the participation of 80 representatives of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI, entities of the United Nations system, humanitarian organizations, donors and civil society, to take stock of the key protection challenges and to agree on action to be taken. Participants agreed on the urgent need to develop coherent and complementary protection strategies, taking into consideration the regional dimension of protection challenges, such as small arms, and to take immediate action in priority areas, such as the establishment of security in the west, in particular in the zone of confidence, introducing justice systems to end impunity and improving assistance to vulnerable groups.

42. The protection network, composed of United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations, has since established working groups to address: (a) protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and host families; (b) protection of children and gender-based violence; (c) physical protection of civilians, humanitarian staff and humanitarian access; (d) justice and the rule of law;

and (e) disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion of ex-combatants and rehabilitation of infrastructures. I encourage UNOCI, the French Licorne force, United Nations entities and the humaaitarian community to jointly develop a comprehensive operational p'an for the protection of civilians.

VII. Financial aspects

43. By its resolution 60/17 B, the General Assembly appropriated a total amount of $420.2 million for the maintenance of UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. I am requesting an additional amount of $52.7 million in the revised budget for the Operation for the period ending 30 June 2007 in response to the increase by 1,500 in the strength of the military and police components of the Operation authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1682 (2006). It is expected that the General Assembly will take action on my proposal during the main part of its sixty-first session. The total resources approved for the mission would support 8,115 military personnel, 450 United Nations police personnel and 750 formed police personnel, authorized by the Security Council in its resolutions 1609 (2005) and 1682 (2006).

44. Should the Council decide to endorse my recommendations in paragraphs 29, 35 and 54, as well as to increase the military and police strength of UNOCI as recommended in paragraph 55, I shall seek additional resources for the Operation from the General Assembly.

45. As at 30 September 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to $186.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,080.2 million. As at 30 September 2006, amounts owed to the UNOCI troop and formed police contributors totalled $17.9 million. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 July 2006.

VIII. Observations

46. Although the Ivorian parties have failed to meet the election deadline for the second time, the successful launching of the initial phases of the PNDDR, the identification of the population and the restoration of state authority in the north provided a practical basis for meaningful progress. The experience in the operation of the mobile courts, including the consensus on the principle of conducting identification and disarmament concomitantly, as well as the lessons drawn from the pre-cantonment phase, the dismantling of militias in the west, the return of civil servants to the north and the reunification of the school examinations system, have all demonstrated the feasibility of the road map adopted by the Prime Minister.

47. Recent Security Council decisions provide a sound framework for carrying forward these initial, but precious gains, in order to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion in the coming 12 months. Resolution 1721 (2006) offers the necessary tools and safeguards that should make it possible to overcome the technical issues that have hitherto impeded progress. Most of these obstacles and the resultant series of stalemates witnessed in the past 12 months were clearly contrived. I am convinced that the main Ivorian political leaders can rise above

narrow partisan and personal interests and make the compromises needed to take their country out of crisis. They have already demonstrated this at the two meetings in Yamoussoukro on 28 February and 5 July 2006. I therefore appeal to President Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bedié, Alassane Ouattara and Guillaume Soro to muster the necessary political will, seize the opportunity offered by the final extension of the transition period and work together with Prime Minister Banny to build on the initial positive steps they have taken on disarmament, identification and the restoration of state authority.

48. The framework offered by Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) must be complemented by efforts from both Ivorian and international stakeholders to nurture a security and political environment in which trust can take root among the main Ivorian political leaders. Sustained dialogue can play a crucial role in building confidence among the leaders. I urge President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny to provide the necessary leadership in this regard, eschew confrontation and maintain a constructive working relationship. International mediators, in particular regional and other leaders, should also assist in building confidence among the Ivorian parties. As recognized by the Security Council, Ivorian civil society, which has so far been marginalized, must be brought into the mainstream of the peace process. At the same time, if civil society is to play a credible role, it too must eschew political agendas and put the national interest first.

49. Ivorian political leaders and civil society should together take a hard and honest look at Côte d'Ivoire's political dispensation, with a view to addressing the factors that underlie the inclination to maintain the status quo. They must together cultivate a culture of political accommodation and tolerance, fight impunity, tackle the hate media, rid the nation of xenophobia, pay attention to the insidious local land and ethnic conflicts in the west and contribute, as called for by the international community, including the African Union and ECOWAS, to put in place a mechanism to guarantee the credibility and transparency of the crucial identification of the population. Above all, for Côte d'Ivoire to emerge from conflict, all Ivorian stakeholders must recognize and accept the need for exceptional measures during and immediately following the transition period, including the possibility of power-sharing arrangements.

50. In the meantime, the most pressing task is to relaunch the implementation of the key outstanding tasks. Regrettably, the Ivorian parties have already lost precious time. Moreover, some of them are pursuing actions that could further polarize political discourse, exacerbate current tensions and lead to widespread violence. Considering that the current 12-month extension of the transition process is final, the situation brooks no further delay. I therefore appeal to all Ivorian parties to extend full cooperation to the Prime Minister in the implementation of the road map for the new transition.

51. This is particularly needed in view of the current political stalemate, which could easily lead to a deterioration of the situation and possibly develop into a long-term stand-off that would be very damaging to the resumption of the key processes. I am, however, pleased to note that some technical preparations for the disarmament and identification processes have continued in spite of the stalemate. The PNDDR is refurbishing cantonment sites, the Prime Minister has drafted ordinances on the hearings in the mobile courts and the establishment of the working groups called for in resolution 1721 (2006). The Ivorian stakeholders now need to open urgent

dialogue and consultations among the Ivorian stakeholders should focus on the resumption of disarmament, the hearings in the mobile courts, the dismantling of the militia and the restoration of state authority, within the framework established by Security Council resolution 1721 (2006). There is ample room for the necessary flexibility and accommodation as regards the concerns of each party. All Ivorian stakeholders should therefore avoid courses of action that depart from the existing and already tested frameworks, discard the gains already made, exacerbate divisions and tensions and risk the renewal of hostilities.

52. For its part, the international community should act in unity in supporting the peace process. It must offer appropriate incentives to the parties, while at the same time it should be ready to act against individuals and parties who deliberately obstruct the peace process, as well as the operations of the impartial forces, and those who commit crimes against the civilian population. In this connection, it is my fervent hope that regional leaders will remain fully engaged with the Ivorian parties, including by impressing on them the need to fulfil, in good faith, all their obligations under the various peace agreements, as well as the decisions and resolutions of the African Union and the Security Council.

53. The peace process cannot succeed without adequate resources. I therefore appeal to Member States to contribute generously the funds needed to support the peace process, in order to ensure sustained implementation of the key processes once they are relaunched. The costs of the key processes are estimated at $24 million for the operation of the mobile courts, $25 million for the redeployment of state administration, $76 million for the elections, $150 million for the PNDDR and $2.5 million for the dismantling and disarmament of the militias. In addition, the costs of the identification process and the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces are yet to be determined.

54. In the light of the above and mindful of the fact that the current transitional period is expected to be completed by 31 October 2007, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the renewal of the mandate of UNOCI for an additional year, until 15 December 2007. Furthermore, in order to enable UNOCI to effectively support the key tasks in the transition process, I urge the Council to approve the recommendations contained in paragraphs 21-34 of the present report, related to the United Nations contribution in support of the key processes. In addition, I seek the Council's support for an expanded presence of the civil affairs, political affairs, human rights and the rule of law components of UNOCI in the northern and western parts of the country, to support the restoration of state administration, which is expected to gather momentum during this final transition period. UNOCI's public information component also plans to develop a robust sensitization campaign in close collaboration with relevant counterparts (Government, the media, civil society and so on) and in coordination with the office of the High Representative for the elections, in its continuing efforts to combat hate media and to sensitize the population on the key processes, including the elections. To that end, the Operation will expand the coverage of its radio to allow widest possible access by the Ivorian people especially those in such remote areas as Aboisso, Bouna, Korhogo and Odienné.

55. The conduct of the politically sensitive identification of the population, as well as the preparations for the elections, will require effective security from the impartial forces. For this reason, and in view of the need to adjust the overall

posture of the UNOCI military component and to enhance its role in facilitating freedom of movement and protecting civilians, I once again appeal to the Security Council to approve the remaining three battalions for UNOCI, out of the four recommended in my seventh progress report (S/2006/2). In that regard, and pursuant to Security Council resolution 1609 (2005), the Council may wish to consider taking advantage of the adjustment in the strength of UNMIL, in particular the envisaged departure of one battalion at the end of 2006, to reinforce UNOCI.

56. The activities of the office of the High Representative for the elections are expected to expand, as this final transition period is expected to yield the long-awaited elections. Although an alternative funding mechanism has been identified, which should go a long way towards addressing some of the difficulties mentioned in my letter to the Security Council dated 16 October 2006 (S/2006/820), the funding of his office from voluntary contributions continues to pose significant challenges. I therefore, once again, appeal to potential donors to urgently provide the resources required to sustain the critical work of the High Representative.

57. In conclusion, I would like to commend my Special Representative, Pierre Schori, and the High Representative for the elections, Gérard Stoudmann, as well as the civilian and military staff of UNOCI for their continued efforts in support of sustainable peace in Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, I would like to express my gratitude to the United Nations country team, humanitarian and development organizations and bilateral donors and the countries that are contributing troops and police personnel to UNOCI, as well as to the African Union and ECOWAS, for their invaluable contribution to the peace process.



Map No. 4220 Rev. 16 UNITED NATIONS
December 2006

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2006/940

Security Council

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6 December 2006

Original: English

Congo, Ghana, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, resolution 1356 (2001) of 19 June 2001, resolution 1425 (2002) of 22 January 2002, and the statements of its President, in particular that of 13 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/31),

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

Reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia through the Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of broad-based and representative institutions and of an inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter,

Reiterating its insistence that all Member States, in particular those in the region, should refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and related measures, and should take all actions necessary to prevent such contraventions,

Emphasizing its willingness to engage with all parties in Somalia who are committed to achieving a political settlement through peaceful and inclusive dialogue, including the Union of Islamic Courts,

Underlining the importance for stability in Somalia of broad-based and representative institutions and of an inclusive political process, *commending* the crucial efforts of the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to promote and encourage political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts, *expressing* its full support for these initiatives, and *affirming* its readiness to assist as appropriate an inclusive political process in Somalia,

Urging both the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts to unite behind and continue a process of dialogue, recommit to the principles of the 22 June 2006 Khartoum Declaration and the agreements made at the 2 to 4 September 2006 Khartoum meeting, and establish a stable security situation inside Somalia,

06-64623 (E) 061206

Calling upon the Union of Islamic Courts to cease any further military expansion and reject those with an extremist agenda or links to international terrorism,

Deploring the bombing in Baidoa on 30 November 2006 and *expressing* the Security Council's concern regarding the continued violence inside Somalia,

Welcoming the agreement reached between the Union of Islamic Courts and the secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development dated 2 December 2006, and *encouraging* IGAD to continue discussions with the Transitional Federal Institutions,

Calls upon all parties inside Somalia and all other States to refrain from action that could provoke or perpetuate violence and violations of human rights, contribute to unnecessary tension and mistrust, endanger the ceasefire and political process, or further damage the humanitarian situation,

Taking note of the note verbale dated 16 October 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council transmitting the text of the Deployment Plan for a Peacekeeping Mission of IGAD in Somalia (IGASOM),

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that the Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions offer the only route to achieving peace and stability in Somalia, *emphasizes* the need for continued credible dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts, and *affirms* therefore that the following provisions of the present resolution, based on the decisions of IGAD and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, aim solely at supporting peace and stability in Somalia through an inclusive political process and creating the conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Somalia;

2. *Urges* the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts to fulfil commitments they have made, resume without delay peace talks on the basis of the agreements reached in Khartoum, and adhere to agreements reached in their dialogue, and *states* its intention to consider taking measures against those that seek to prevent or block a peaceful dialogue process, overthrow the Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or take action that further threatens regional stability;

3. *Decides* to authorize IGAD and Member States of the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia, to be reviewed after an initial period of six months by the Security Council with a briefing by IGAD, with the following mandate drawing on the relevant elements of the mandate and concept of operations specified in the Deployment Plan for IGASOM:

(a) To monitor progress by the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts in implementing agreements reached in their dialogue;

(b) To ensure free movement and safe passage of all those involved with the dialogue process;

(c) To maintain and monitor security in Baidoa;

(d) To protect members of the Transitional Federal Institutions and Government as well as their key infrastructure;

(e) To train the Transitional Federal Institutions' security forces to enable them to provide their own security and to help facilitate the re-establishment of national security forces of Somalia;

4. *Endorses* the specification in the IGAD Deployment Plan that those States that border Somalia would not deploy troops to Somalia;

5. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) shall not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment and technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the force referred to in paragraph 3 above;

6. *Encourages* Member States to provide financial resources for IGASOM;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Commission of the African Union and the secretariat of IGAD, to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the mandate of IGASOM within thirty (30) days, and every sixty (60) days thereafter;

8. *Emphasizes* the continued contribution made to Somalia's peace and security by the arms embargo, *demands* that all Member States, in particular those of the region, fully comply with it, and *reiterates* its intention to consider urgently ways to strengthen its effectiveness, including through targeted measures in support of the arms embargo;

9. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter

United Nations A/61/608–S/2006/941

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-first session
Agenda items 13 and 14

The situation in the Middle East

Question of Palestine

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 5 December 2006 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to inform you of the recent number of Qassam rocket attacks by Palestinian terrorists in the Gaza Strip against Israel over the past week.

From Sunday, 26 November 2006, until Monday, 4 December 2006, no less than 15 Qassam rockets were fired by Palestinian terrorists at Israeli communities in the south. Five of these Qassam rockets landed in Israel. During these attacks, numerous civilians were lightly injured and countless others were treated for trauma.

Palestinian Qassam rockets have been unabashedly and relentlessly launched by terrorists in the Gaza Strip for some time now, long before Israel withdrew from that area more than one year ago.

Most disturbing, however, is that these recent attacks come after a ceasefire was initiated and agreed upon between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, which went into effect on the morning of Sunday, 26 November 2006. The continuation of terror attacks, in violation of the ceasefire, demonstrates the severity of the challenge facing the Palestinian leadership these days and its inability to stop terror completely.

In the past week, Prime Minister Olmert extended a hand to the Palestinian people to seek peace and security together. If the ceasefire will hold on the ground, then no political efforts should be spared to return the parties to the negotiating table. And that begins with ensuring that the Palestinian leadership embraces the three conditions of the international community: to recognize Israel, renounce violence and terror and abide by previous agreements. Otherwise, I fear, the opportunity will be lost.

06-64301 (E) 051206

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13 and 14 and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daniel **Carmon**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2006/942

Security Council

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7 December 2006

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Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 5578th meeting, on 6 December 2006, the Security Council considered its draft report to the General Assembly covering the period from 1 August 2005 to 31 July 2006. The Security Council adopted the draft report without a vote.

06-64781 (E) 071206

United Nations S/2006/943

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 December 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 29 November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I am attaching herewith Uganda's response to the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006) (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Francis K. **Butagira**
Permanent Representative

06-64553 (E) 121206

Annex to the letter dated 29 November 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Response of the Government of Uganda to the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Government of Uganda welcomes the efforts by the United Nations towards the stabilisation of Somalia. Government of Uganda regrets that the UN has dragged its feet in responding to the request by IGAD and AU for the lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia to pave the way for the deployment of IGASOM in support of the Transitional Federal Institutions. Government wishes to recall the mandate of IGASOM as being two-fold : to provide protection and training to the TFIs.

Government wishes to recall that the Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government on Somalia was held in Nairobi on 5th September 2006 attended by Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In the Communique issued at the conclusion of the Summit, it was recalled that the 6th Session of the Assembly of the African Union (AU) held in Abuja on 31 January, 2005 made a decision to deploy an IGAD Peace Support Mission. The Nairobi Summit also reaffirmed the deployment of IGASOM in line with IGAD's earlier decisions and expressed support for the on-going dialogue between the TFG ad the ICU. The Summit further called on the UN Security Council to convene urgently in order to consider taking necessary action in accordance with its Presidential Statement of 13 July, 2006.

Furthermore, in the Communique issued at their Summit in Abuja, the IGAD Heads of State and Government under the Chairmanship of H.E. The President of Uganda, instructed their Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff to meet urgently and decide, in collaboration with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, on the details and modalities of the deployment of IGASOM.

However, the reluctancy by the UN to lift the arms embargo has made it impossible for IGASOM to deploy in Somalia and instead a vacuum emerged and opportunistic forces took advantage of the same.

The resultant confusion has thus engendered speculation.

2.0 REBUTTAL

It is against this background that Government of Uganda takes great exception and objects to the inclusion on the list of the violators of the UN arms embargo on Somalia and questions the methodology and conclusions of the UN Monitoring Group which authored the Report in question.

2.1 Para 54

The Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia alleges that flights were made from Massawa, Eritrea to Mogadishu International Airport, Somalia with a Ugandan registered B-707 No 5X-EOT using call sign MHU of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd.

The fact of the matter is that this aircraft was sold by DAS Air Cargo to Great lakes Airways, who in turn sold it to Euro Oceanic Air Transport Ltd. It was thereafter leased by Euro Oceanic BLV of Brussels to Air Memphis but taken to Cairo, Egypt for maintenance in December, 2004 under Registration No.5X-GLA by Euro Oceanic BLV. It has since not returned to Uganda.

Due to purchase payment problems, Great Lakes Airways placed a lien on the plane and Air Memphis could not use it, that the complaint in Annex IX. Subsequently, Air Memphis changed its name to Sky Jet Aviation Authority in May 2006 but it has not yet been granted an operator's licence by Uganda Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). It has an ICAO call sign MHU.

2.2 Para 55

The Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia further states that Sky Jet explained that the 8th and 10th October flights were irregularly operated by Euro Oceanic BLV of Brussels using their smuggled leased aircraft above to transport cargo from Eritrea to Somalia. However, records with the Kampala Sky Jet office indicate that the lease was terminated by Sky Jet on 23rd May, 2006, long before the flights in issue were undertaken.

Government of Uganda should, therefore, bears no responsibility for the alleged transactions using the cited B-707 nor for the origin of the flights nor for their cargo.

2.3 para 129

The allegation in the Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia that the Government of Uganda provided arms, ammunition and military personnel in support of the TFG is a falsehood without any credibilty or evidence, given the framework for such deployment and conditions precedent to such an undertaking within the AU and IGAD initiatives. These include the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by the UN Security Council Resolution 773(1992), cooordination and consensus on mandate within IGAD member states and funding from the AU for the peace support mission under IGASOM. Uganda could not have acted without these conditions being fulfilled.

Further, Article 210(d) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides that Parliament shall make laws for the deployement of troops outside Uganda. Pursuant to the foregoing, Section 39(2) of the UPDF Act (2005) provides that deployment of troops for purposes of peace keeing shall be done with the approval of

Parliament, a process that has not yet been undertaken and hence no such a deployment could have taken place.

2.4 Para 130

On the basis of the reasons and circumstances explained above, Uganda further wishes to categorically refute the allegation contained in the Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia about deployment of the UPDF in Baidoa on 26th August 2006 or on any other date using 03 aircraft or any other means of transport to ship military or civil hardware or equipment.

2.5 para 131

The letter Ref.S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.48 dated 31st August 2006 from the Chairman of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Permanent Representative of the Government of Uganda to the United Nations was not received in time for Government of Uganda to provide a response by the deadline of 9th September, 2006.

The violations cited in Para 130 above formed the basis for the request for details by the UN Monitoring Group in that letter i.e allegations of troop deployments and cargo transported to Baidoa or elsewhere in Somalia by Government of Uganda or Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF)

The allegations are false, spurious and malicious given the above background, lack of legal mandate and chronology of events.

Government of Uganda wishes to submit that failure to respond to the Report within the period of 09 days set by the Group does not render Uganda guilty of the alleged violations in the Report of the UN Monitoring Group.

3.0 CONCLUSION

The Government of Uganda while calling for the lifting of the UN arms embargo, remains committed to ensuring that the UN arms embargo is not violated as long as it stands. Government of Uganda cannot violate its own Constitution, the understanding reached at the level of the AU and IGAD nor violate the UN Resolutions.

The allegations against Uganda as contained in the Report of the UN Monitoring Group are unfounded and Government of Uganda denies them in total and wishes to challenge the UN Monitoring Group to cross-check with their sources and provide evidence implicating UPDF or Government of Uganda as a whole in the violation of the UN arms embargo on Somalia.

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Letter dated 1 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, this is to inform you that an addendum to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement was signed in Juba on 1 November 2006. Please find attached herewith the said addendum (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Francis K. **Butagira**
Permanent Representative

06-64636 (E) 081206

Annex to the letter dated 1 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement Juba/Sudan

ADDENDUM 1

Preamble:

WHEREAS:

a. The Government of the Republic of Uganda (GOU) and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties") signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (the Agreement) on the 26th August 2006, under which the Parties agreed to cease all hostile military and other actions and propaganda aimed at each other, that may undermine the Peace Talks;

b. Some difficulties have been experienced in the implementation of the Agreement, necessitating review of the Agreement;

c. The Parties, in accordance with Articles 8 and 11 of the Agreement, have agreed to review and have reviewed the said Agreement.

Now therefore the Parties agree as follows:

1. **Recommitment of the Parties**

a) This Addendum shall form part of the Agreement, and the Parties hereby recommit themselves to implementing the terms of the Agreement and the Addendum.

b) In case of any conflict and/or inconsistency between this Addendum and the Agreement the provisions of this Addendum shall prevail to the extent of such conflict or inconsistency.

2. **Violations**

Pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement, the following shall constitute violations of the Agreement and shall be deemed to be actions that may undermine the Peace Talks:

a) Any attacks, threats or acts of violence directed against the other Party and/or civilians and/or any other person or persons by either Party or both Parties.

b) Subject to the provisions of section 4 (e) below, failure by the LRA to assemble or to remain in the designated Assembly Areas.

c) Removal of food and/or service support from the Assembly Areas.

d) Obstruction of the activities of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT).

e) Acquisition, recovery or replenishment of arms, ammunition or other military equipment by the LRA within Southern Sudan.

f) Other acts investigated by the CHMT and/or determined by the Mediator to be violations of the Agreement.

3. **Determination on Hostile Propaganda**

a) The Mediator shall, on receipt of any complaint arising from Article 2 of the Agreement, refer the matter to the CHMT, if the complaint is not made by the CHMT, determine whether the complaint discloses any act(s) or omission(s) that undermine(s) the standing of a party by the other.

b) Upon receiving a report of such determination the Mediator shall convene a meeting of both Parties to discuss how such a violation can be handled.

4. **Additional Obligations of the Government of Southern Sudan**

a) During the subsistence of the Agreement, the Government of Southern Sudan shall ensure that the LRA does not acquire, recover or replenish arms and ammunitions within its territory.

b) Save in the most exceptional circumstances as shall be determined by the CHMT, and with the consent of the Mediator, there shall be no supply of food and/or service support to the LRA outside an Assembly Area.

c) The Government of Southern Sudan shall ensure security in the general area East of Nimule – Juba Road to the satisfaction of the Parties.

d) Special arrangements shall be made for the personal security and protection of the property of the members of the CHMT and the LRA delegation, and in the event that the Peace Talks fail, they shall be guaranteed safe passage or escorted to safety.

e) The Government of Southern Sudan shall ensure adequate security, logistical and service support to the LRA Assembly Areas and such security, logistical and service support shall be confirmed by the Mediator and/or verified by the CHMT.

f) The Mediator shall provide to the Parties and the CHMT maps delineating the Assembly Areas described in section 5 of this Addendum.

5. Assembly Areas

a) During the subsistence of the Agreement the LRA in Southern Sudan shall assemble its forces within 15 (fifteen) kilometers radius from the administrative headquarters of Owiny-Ki-Bul and 10 (ten) kilometers radius from the administrative headquarters of Ri-Kwangba within the Sudan.

b) The forces of the Parties shall remain as far apart as 15 (fifteen) kilometers of the specified perimeters of the Assembly Area at Owiny-Ki-Bul.

c) Except with the express permission of the Mediator, and with notification of the CHMT, nobody shall visit the LRA Assembly Areas.

6. Monitoring

a) Every effort shall be made to ensure that the African Union or any

other body acceptable to the Parties appoints military or other personnel to assist in the implementation of the Agreement.

b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 9 (a) iii of the Agreement, the CHMT shall be deemed to be and to have been validly constituted whenever the Team Leader and two representatives of each Party are present.

c) The status of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be reviewed not later than December 1, 2006.

d) The members of the CHMT shall enjoy full protection of both Parties.

7. **Assembling**

a) The LRA east of the Nile, within Southern Sudan, shall complete assembling in Owiny-Ki-Bul within one week after the signature of this Addendum and after section 4 (e) has been complied with.

b) The Mediator shall provide logistical and service support at Ri-Kwangba within two weeks after the signature of this Addendum.

c) After the provision of the logistical and service support at Ri-Kwangba, the LRA shall within two weeks complete assembling of their forces.

d) Within one week of the assembly of the LRA within Owiny-Ki-Bul, the LRA shall provide all relevant information to the Mediator concerning members of the LRA who may still be in Uganda.

e) The Mediator, the CHMT and the LRA shall ensure that the LRA forces remaining in Uganda relocate to Owiny-Ki-Bul within two weeks.

8. **Review of Implementation**

The implementation of the Agreement shall be reviewed at least once a month and the Agreement shall lapse upon the signing of a formal ceasefire agreement between the Parties.

In witness whereof, the duly authorized representatives of the Parties have signed this Addendum at Juba on the 1st day of November 2006.

(*Signed*) Hon. Ruhakana **Rugunda** (Dr)
Minister of Internal Affairs and
Head of GoU Delegation

(*Signed*) Mr. Martin **Ojul**
Leader of the LRA/M Delegation

Witnessed by:
(*Signed*) H.E. Lt. General Rick Machar **Teny-Dhurgon** (PhD)
Vice President, Government of Southern Sudan
And Mediator of the Peace Talks